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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines the roles of gender equity and family in shaping lowest-low fertility. 
Although low fertility is a heated topic in most advanced societies, conventional approaches to 
low fertility, such as the second demographic transition theory, have predominantly focused on 
low fertility in Western countries. Recent literature on low fertility demonstrates that gender 
equity plays an important role in understanding cross-national variations in low fertility. This 
project uses South Korea to examine issues of low fertility and its association with the role of 
family and gender equity. South Korea is marked by low institutional gender equity, a strong 
normative focus idealizing the two-child family and extremely low fertility. In order to integrate 
the case of South Korea as critical to a theoretical understanding of the impact of gender equity, 
this dissertation explores the ways in which women shape their fertility intentions and actual 
fertility in relation to gender equity.  
Using data from the three waves of the Korean Longitudinal Survey of Women & 
Families, I examined the intersection of low fertility, marriage, and family with an emphasis on 
the role of gender equity in explaining lowest-low fertility in South Korea. In examining four 
aspects of gender equity in the family, my findings suggest that South Korean women with 
traditional gender role attitudes may face high levels of pressure to fulfill their expected roles in 
the family, including raising a high-quality child, with no or little support from husbands and 
institutions. Moreover, my findings suggest that women’s positive interactions with their 
husbands, based on the sharing of housework and childcare or educational responsibility for their 
children, provide favorable conditions for women’s marital quality. My analysis emphasizes that 
having a second child is likely to be a constrained choice dependent on supportive environments 
for the family. The availability of tangible support from multiple sources may determine the gap 
between fertility intentions and fertility behavior, especially in contexts where two-child family 
ideals are still pervasive.  
I have brought a new perspective to the growing body of literature on low fertility, a 
perspective that is especially suited to cultural contexts in which high educational aspirations and 
the traditional family model are pervasive. This research makes two main contributions to the 
literature on gender and low fertility. First, it demonstrates the mechanisms through which 
gender equity in the family shapes women’s marriage and fertility, both in terms of women’s 
fertility behavior and realizing their fertility intentions. Second, it offers new insights on the 
interplay between the state and the family in achieving family demands, including work-family 
balance and having an additional child. It further increases our understanding of the different 
contexts that are revealed in a rapid fertility decline, lowest-low fertility, low gender equity 
regimes, and weak institutional support for childrearing. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation examines the roles of gender equity and family in shaping lowest-low fertility. 
Although low fertility is a heated topic in most advanced societies, conventional approaches to 
low fertility, such as the second demographic transition theory, have predominantly focused on 
low fertility in Western countries. Recent literature on low fertility demonstrates that gender 
equity plays an important role in understanding cross-national variations in low fertility, mainly 
in Europe. Simultaneously, scholars have paid their attention to changes in sustained very low 
fertility in Europe, which led them to coin the term lowest-low fertility, a level of the total 
fertility rate at or below 1.3 (Kohler et al. 2002: 641).  
Ironically, there is profound evidence that women’s desires for larger families, typically 
with two children, continue across most advanced countries, even including some of the 
countries indicating lowest-low fertility (e.g., Sobotka and Beaujouan 2014). The gap between 
fertility attitudes and actual behavior is a notable aspect in understanding low fertility. Scholars, 
including Bongaarts (2001; 2002) and Morgan (2003), demonstrate that this discrepancy between 
actual fertility and desired family size is a new phenomenon, and it results from the interplay 
between fertility-enhancing factors and fertility-depressing factors in developed countries. 
Achieving the two-child family ideal can be a severely constrained choice depending on 
individuals’ socio-structural conditions and an embedded institutional context. How do women 
negotiate within their structural conditions, as well as the institutional context, to achieve their 
fertility goals? What factors play a significant role for a possible exit from the lowest-low 
fertility?  
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This project uses South Korea to examine issues of low fertility and its association with 
the role of family and gender equity. The recent and rapid declines in fertility across East Asia 
may provide unique avenues for the examination of variation within a national setting. South 
Korea is an East Asian country that has experienced a relatively recent rapid decline in fertility 
and records one of the lowest fertility rates at below 1.2 in 2014. Concurrently, the majority of 
adults express their ideal family size as a two-child family, and some of them express a desire for 
three children. All told, Korea is marked by low institutional gender equity, a strong normative 
focus idealizing the two-child family and extremely low fertility. This dissertation explores the 
ways in which women shape their fertility intentions and actual fertility in relation to gender 
equity. The fundamental element for understanding levels of gender equity is the role of social 
institutions, including the state, marriage and the family.   
 
MOTIVATIONS 
There is a great deal to be gained from understanding the relationship between gender 
equity and low fertility both in general and in South Korea specifically. Korea is an excellent 
case study for expanding our understanding of the relationship between gender equity and 
fertility, given its unique timing with regard to the rapid decline in fertility and persistent 
normative ideas of a two-child family. The fall in the total fertility rate
1
 (TFR) from 3.43 in 1975 
to 1.19 in 2014 in South Korea is drastic (Statistics Korea 2014). Low fertility in South Korea 
may be a constrained choice reflecting gender inequality, increasing psychological burdens in 
raising children, and economic realities. Understanding how the unique South Korean societal 
context shapes fertility attitudes and behavior will help to broaden understanding of the 
                                                             
1 Total fertility rate refers to the average number of children that women would expect to have throughout her 
childbearing years, following the age-specific fertility rates for that year (Population Reference Bureau 2014)  
3 
 
relationship between gender equity and fertility by extending the existing literature on the topic 
and providing understudied aspects of gender equity uniquely situated in non-Western low 
fertility contexts. I seek to determine what factors affect women’s fertility attitudes and actual 
behaviors under the institutional constraints of low fertility, highlighting the role of gender 
equity and family in shaping different fertility attitudes and behaviors at the individual level. A 
greater understanding of the mechanisms of low fertility in South Korea also has practical 
implications for policymakers interested in population dynamics as well as gender equality in the 
family in South Korea and elsewhere.  
 
Contribution to Theory 
Studies of low fertility have emphasized the importance of the relationship between 
gender equity and fertility over the past decade. Peter McDonald’s (2000a; 2000b) theory of 
gender equity postulates that very low fertility is attributed to the incoherence in levels of gender 
equity between individual-oriented institutions (e.g., education and employment) and family-
oriented institutions in a society. McDonald compares fertility variations among European 
countries and argues that countries with very low fertility, such as Southern European countries, 
show great inconsistency in levels of gender equity, due to high levels of gender equity in 
individual-oriented institutions versus low levels of gender equity in family-oriented institutions. 
The gender equity theory is intended to explain fertility variations across countries by 
emphasizing the levels of gender equity at the institutional level (McDonald 2013).  
There is a growing body of literature which aims to provide new theoretical insights into 
the relationship between gender equity and fertility in economically advanced countries (e.g., 
Anderson and Kohler 2015; Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015; Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and 
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Lappegård 2015). An important theme arising from this literature is that gender equity regimes, 
linked to socioeconomic development and societal contexts, are a key driver of trends in low 
fertility among advanced countries. Yet scholars have not critically assessed the effect of gender 
equity within the non-Western institutional context of lowest-low fertility.  
Although the existing theories partly include East Asian countries in the framework of 
gender equity and low fertility, there is scant research examining the link between gender equity 
and fertility within a single context. A more elaborative theoretical framework highlighting the 
importance of gender equity is necessary for understanding fertility variations within a country. 
The South Korean context combines strong traditional gender norms in the private sphere with 
high human capital and a rapid decline in fertility during the period of demographic transition 
(Anderson and Kohler 2015). The emergence of lowest-low fertility in South Korea is fairly 
recent, and creates a substantial mismatch between strong two-child family ideals and actual 
individual fertility. South Korea therefore provides an opportunity to investigate the relationship 
between gender equity and fertility, and family more broadly, in a context characterized by low 
levels of gender equity embedded in patriarchal gender relations.  
 
Policy contributions 
In order to examine issues of gender equity and fertility in South Korea, I will utilize 
publically available data from a nationally representative longitudinal survey. Low fertility and 
(relatedly) population ageing are high priority issues for many advanced countries’ governments, 
including the South Korean government; and they are also important issues for international 
population and family policy initiatives. One of the biggest concerns relating to very low fertility 
for policy makers is associated with the future existence of peoples concerned (McDonald 
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2000a). A small difference in the TFR can lead to substantially different demographic and social 
consequences. For instance, a TFR of 1.3 in South Korea implies that the size of the stable South 
Korean population will be fall to 50 percent of its initial size in 45 years.
2
 In a stable population 
with TFR of 1.0, the population’s halving times are only 29 years (Kohler et al. 2002: 642). Low 
fertility rates are not only an important demographic and social issue in Korea, but they also 
reflect individuals’ constrained agency due to structural and individual constraints. My work will 
shed light on women’s resilience in making their reproductive choices and identify non-
institutional support within the institutional constraints.  
Understanding the underlying causes of low fertility and developing programs and 
policies to facilitate reproductive agency is urgently needed in addressing issues of low fertility. 
The experience of very low fertility in countries within the European Union (EU) suggests that a 
comprehensive understanding of patterns of low fertility and identifying its main correlating 
factors is useful in policymaking. For example, there are scholarly debates whether the 
governments in Europe should push for gender equality to increase fertility (Neyer 2011; Oláh 
2011; Philipov 2011; Toulemon 2011).  In a similar vein, my project makes a valuable 
contribution to understanding the social implications of low fertility in South Korea by 
increasing our knowledge of the link between gender equity and fertility in the specific context 
of South Korea. By integrating the case of South Korea into the debate, and by making it critical 
to the theoretical understanding the impact of gender equity, my research provides insight into 
the design of policy intervention for low fertility countries. 
 
 
                                                             
2 Stable populations refer to theoretical models having age-specific fertility and mortality rates that remain constant 
over time (Rowland 2003: 300-306).  
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Previous literature has examined the effects of demographic, socioeconomic, ideational, and 
institutional factors on fertility, and a lot of that literature has focused on substantial fertility 
differences within and across countries. Ample studies have also investigated women’s or 
couples’ childbearing decision-making processes by identifying factors that either facilitate or 
inhibit fertility. More recently, scholars have examined differences between fertility intentions 
and actual fertility, which have been observed in most countries at the end of their fertility 
transitions (Balbo and Mills 2011; Bongaarts 2001; Morgan and Taylor 2006). This dissertation 
adds to studies of low fertility by extending current frameworks to better emphasize the role of 
gender equity with an empirical investigation of South Korea, the country with the lowest 
fertility rate in the world. Drawing on multiple theories closely related to the importance of 
gender equity and the family, this dissertation extends our knowledge by conceptualizing and 
operationalizing gender equity at the micro-level and examining the role of gender equity in 
relation to the impact of family network and individual social characteristics, with the aim of 
providing a more comprehensive understanding of individual fertility differentials and of the 
mismatch between fertility intentions and achieved fertility within a non-Western lowest-low 
fertility country. 
 In this section, I first examine the literature on low fertility with a special emphasis on the 
role of gender equity. I then examine the evidence for the impact of gender equity at both macro- 
and micro-levels. I pay special attention to the potential aspects of gender equity affecting 
women’s fertility decision-making, specifically in the context of South Korea, and in East Asia 
more broadly. While there is a growing body of literature concerning the gap between fertility 
intentions and outcomes which links the effect to demographic or socioeconomic factors, there is 
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limited evidence on how gender equity shapes the mismatch between fertility intentions and 
outcomes and the role gender equity plays in the context of patriarchal gender relations and little 
institutional support for gender equality. Investigating a case with different contextual and 
institutional backgrounds will provide a better understanding of what gender equity means in this 
specific context and the different ways it plays out in concert with country-specific institutional 
environments.   
 
Gender Equity and Fertility  
Evidence suggests that at the national level, the relationship between trends in female labor force 
participation and trends in fertility rates changed from negative to positive in the mid-1980s (e.g., 
Brewster and Rindfuss 2000; Del Boca 2002; Morgan 2003; Rindfuss et al. 2007). Sociologists 
believe the formerly negative association between female labor force participation and fertility 
can be attributed to the difficulty of combining the demands of childrearing with those of 
employment (e.g., Brewster and Rindfuss 2000). However, recent evidence suggests that the 
association between women in the workplace and fertility rates is now positive, as economically 
advanced countries with high female labor force participation also tend to have higher fertility 
rates (e.g., Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari 2009). Scholars call this phenomenon an upturn in 
fertility trends or a reversal of fertility trends.  
The importance of gender equity has received increasing attention from sociologists 
seeking for an explanation of this upturn in fertility trends observed in economically advanced 
countries over the second half of the twentieth century. There are theoretical discourses 
emphasizing the impact of gender equity on fertility variations among economically advanced 
countries. McDonald (2000a; 2000b; 2013) views gender equity as a determinant of low fertility 
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and explains that the incoherence between the levels of gender equity in social institutions – 
sustained gender inequity in the institution of the family – has resulted in extremely low fertility 
among countries with below-replacement fertility levels.
3
 Low fertility emerges when many 
women perceive that their cultural and institutional context does not support job opportunities for 
working mothers (McDonald 2013). In this context, women react to the inequitable gender 
systems by having few or no children. In Southern European countries and advanced East Asian 
countries, for example, having children does restrict women’s opportunity for labor force 
participation, so that these countries have very low fertility rates. 
Building upon an influential theoretical framework of gender equity by McDonald 
(2000a; 2000b), sociological literature examining low fertility emphasizes the importance of 
gender, often in tandem with levels of socioeconomic development and female labor force 
participation. McDonald’s notion of the inconsistency among levels of gender equity in social 
institutions is similar to what Hochschild (1989) labels “the stalled revolution” and, more 
recently, what Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård (2015) refer to as “the gender 
revolution”.  Goldscheider et al. (2015) propose an alternative theoretical framework to explain 
increasing evidence of a reversal in fertility trends. They posit that the reversal in fertility links to 
two stages of the ongoing gender revolution. The first half of the gender revolution leads to 
weakened families due to increased stresses on the family in relation to structural changes in 
women's roles in the public sphere. The second half of the gender revolution, on the other hand, 
brings in families strengthened (e.g., increased fertility) by increasing male involvement. What 
                                                             
3 Scholars often use gender equality and gender equity interchangeably. However, the concepts behind these two 
terms are distinct. Gender equality can be defined as equal outcomes for men and women in domains such as 
education, employment, wages or housework (Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015). However, gender equity is a 
subtler concept because it concerns perceptions of fairness and opportunities, which can result in different outcomes 
for men and women (McDonald 2013). Scholars believe that gender equity is an appropriate concept for studies of 
fertility, but it is difficult to measure at the societal level (Mills 2010; McDonald 2013). 
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Goldscheider et al. (2015) believe to be the reason for positive outcomes in the family (e.g., 
increasing fertility, union formation and union stability) is the importance of male involvement 
in the family for changing gender relationships. This approach makes their theory distinctive 
from the following two theoretical approaches, which highlight the importance of institutional 
interventions in changing gender relations.         
In accordance with McDonald and Goldscheider and her colleagues, Esping-Andersen 
and Billari (2015) posit that family relationships should change reflecting new expectations 
towards gender-egalitarian family norms for pro-family outcomes, such as achieving the desired 
number of children. Esping-Andersen and Billari (2015) also argue that the normative standards 
of gender egalitarianism depend on country-specific institutional environments (e.g., levels of 
generalized trust) as these shape the speed of diffusion of gender-egalitarian norms to the entire 
population. In a similar vein, Anderson and Kohler (2015) agree that gender equity, which is 
closely linked to the onset and the pace of the socioeconomic development, is a key driver of 
fertility variation in economically advanced countries. However, they emphasize the pivotal role 
of time in creating a mismatch between institutional gender equity and household gender equity 
since their theory extends the phases of the demographic transition. Anderson and Kohler (2015) 
argue that changes in gender relations are imminent in East Asian countries such as South Korea 
because South Korea has not had enough time to achieve high levels of household gender equity.   
 
The effect of gender equity on fertility at the macro-level 
There is evidence that institutional interventions for shaping egalitarian gender relations 
positively affect fertility at the national level. The state’s family policies, cash benefits, and 
childcare arrangements can reduce the conflict between work and family that women would 
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otherwise have; and their effects on fertility vary by countries. In her review of the literature 
linking policies and fertility, Gauthier (2007) concludes that evidence shows mixed findings 
about the impact of policies on fertility. Importantly, however, her review reveals that evidence 
based on micro-level data supports the hypothesis that policies produce a small positive impact 
on fertility, and that the impact varies according to country and parity. 
Studies investigating the impact of policies associated with maternal or paternal leave and 
childcare characteristics on fertility at the individual level suggest mixed findings. Using data 
from Finland and Norway, Rosen (2004) suggests a positive impact of parental leave on fertility, 
but no significant impact of childcare provisions and child benefits on fertility. Hank and 
Kreyenfield (2003) also find no significant impact of public childcare availability on the 
probability of a first birth in Germany. In contrast, Del Boca (2002) suggests that the availability 
of childcare increases the likelihood of having a child in Italy. Rindfuss et al. (2007) also confirm 
the positive impact of childcare availability on the timing of having a first child based on data 
from Norway. Using the same data, Rindfuss et al. (2010) further suggest that the institutional 
arrangements for high-quality, affordable, worker-friendly childcare increase childbearing at 
every parity progression. However, the impact of institutional childcare arrangements tends to be 
lower without accompanying changes in gender equality or in other factors that influence 
women’s achieving their desired family size, such as support from husbands (McDonald 2002; 
Rindfuss et al. 2010).  
 
The effect of gender equity on fertility at the individual-level     
The increasing importance of gender in fertility studies has stimulated a lot of empirical 
research testing its role in fertility decision-making at the individual level (Balbo et al. 2013; 
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Mills 2010). Although the reviewed theories aim to explain country-level variations in fertility, 
empirical applications have mostly conducted at the micro-level.
4
 Studies examining the 
individual fertility variations within a single context employ the gender division of household 
labor as a measure of household gender equity (Cooke 2009; Short and Torr 2004; Mills et al. 
2008; Olàh 2003; Tazi-Preve et al. 2004). Sociologists linking low fertility to conflict between 
the roles of mothers and workers focus on the importance of support from husbands in terms of 
housework or childcare (e.g., Goldscheider et al. 2013; 2015). The remainder of this section 
discusses the existing measures of gender equity at the micro-level and further argues the 
necessity of diversifying measures of gender equity for the investigation of individual fertility 
variations within the context of lowest-low fertility. This review will pave the way for my core 
argument in the chapter 3, which incorporates educational responsibility for children into our 
understanding of household-level gender equity situated in contexts with high levels of 
investments in children’s education, including South Korea and other East Asian counties.   
Findings from several studies support a positive link between gender equity (reflected in 
contributions to housework) and fertility intentions. Neyer, Lappegård, and Vignoli (2013) find 
that among a sample of European women with one or two children, a more equal distribution of 
housework between a couple increases their likelihood of desiring an additional child. In 
Hungary, women sharing housework and childcare with their spouses are more likely to want a 
second child (Olàh 2003). Italian women who have one child and who bear more than 75% of the 
housework are less likely to express an intension to have a second child, in comparison with 
women who contribute a smaller share of housework (Mills et al. 2008). Data from Austria also 
indicates the importance of household actions over expectations, as sharing housework exerts a 
                                                             
4  See Mills (2010) for macro-level application of the theory of gender equity. 
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positive effect on desired fertility, while attitudes towards sharing housework exhibit no effect 
(Tazi-Preve, Bichlbauer, and Goujon 2004).  
Evidence also supports a relationship between gender equity within the family and 
individual fertility outcomes. Findings support a positive link between fathers’ sharing of 
housework or childcare and having a second child in the U.S. (Torr and Short 2004) and Italy 
(Cooke 2009). In Sweden, where family policies are more egalitarian, a discontinuity between 
attitudes towards gender roles in housework and actual housework behavior reduces the 
likelihood of having a second child (Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Branden 2013).  
Previous fertility research operationalizes household gender equity in several ways. 
These include the relative share of housework or childcare between a couple (Cooke 2009; Mills 
et al. 2008; Olàh 2003; Torr and Short 2004), women’s satisfaction with the division of 
housework or childcare (Neyer et al. 2013) and gender role attitudes within the family 
(Goldscheider et al. 2013). Different aspects of gender relations within the family may be more 
significant contingent upon national gender equity regimes (Miettinen, Bastern and Rotkirch 
2011). Across existing research, male contributions to housework and childcare play a key role 
in shaping fertility intentions and outcomes, particularly in longstanding low fertility and low 
gender equity countries such as Italy (Miettinen et al. 2011) and Hungary (Olàh 2003).  
South Korea provides an interesting case of a rapid fertility decline, lowest-low fertility, 
low gender equity and weak institutional supports for child rearing. Will men’s participation in 
housework and childcare positively affect fertility realization in South Korea, as they do in 
Europe? In chapter 3, I explore how the relationship between gender equity within the family and 
individual fertility may work differently in concert with the unique gender equity contexts of 
South Korea. To reflect a unique cultural emphasis on education, I expand gender equity theory 
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to incorporate patterns of decision-making about children’s education. A significant difference 
between my dissertation and previous empirical studies examining the role of gender equity at 
the micro-level building upon the framework of gender equity will lie in its extended attitudinal 
and experiential aspects of gender equity reflecting the unique context of South Korea, a 
phenomenon sometimes referred to as “educational fever” (Anderson and Kohler 2013). 
 
Gender Equity in the Family, Marital Quality, and Fertility 
The Division of Household Labor and Marital Quality 
In his review of the research on household labor during the 1990s, Coltrane (2000) 
pointed out that most studies explained the operationalization of housework or household labor 
in the analysis with no explicit definition of the concept. However, household labor has 
consistently been conceptualized in the literature as “unpaid work done to maintain family 
members and/or a home” (Shelton and John 1996: 300). The tasks included in the 
conceptualization of household labor vary by study and social context. However, some tasks are 
commonly classified as part of household labor: housecleaning, meal planning, cooking, 
dishwashing (or loading the dishwasher), cleaning up after meals, grocery shopping, laundry 
(washing, ironing, and mending clothes), caring for sick family members, taking out the garbage, 
paying bills, and transporting family members (Arrighi and Maume 2000; Badr and Acitelli 2008; 
Cunningham 2007; Lincoln 200). Housework often means routine tasks (usually performed by 
women) requiring on-going and time-consuming labor, such as laundry, cooking, cleaning up 
after meals and doing dishes (Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010).  
Although we have observed unprecedented changes in women’s participation in the labor 
force during the last several decades, it is well documented that women in many countries, 
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including the United States, continue to perform the majority of unpaid tasks in their homes 
(Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard 2010). Family sociologists have called this phenomenon the 
“stalled gender revolution” (England 2010) or the “incomplete gender revolution” (Esping-
Anderson 2009). Among three main micro-level theoretical perspectives identified by Lachance-
Grzela and Bouchard’s (2010) comprehensive review of the literature5, gender ideology 
perspective connects the gendered division of household labor to the sense of fairness and its link 
to marital quality.  
 The gender ideology perspective posits an inverse relationship between the unequal 
division of household labor and egalitarian gender attitudes (Davis et al. 2007). It is more useful 
in explaining women’s participation in household labor than in explaining men’s (Bianchi et al. 
2000). Several empirical studies support this hypothesized relationship between the division of 
household labor and gender role attitudes (e.g., Davis et al. 2007; Fuwa 2004; Knudsen and 
Wæ rness 2008; Parkman 2004). Fuwa (2004), for instance, finds that women holding egalitarian 
gender attitudes are likely to spend less time on housework than women holding traditional 
gender attitudes.  
 Along similar lines, gender construction perspective, a variant of gender ideology 
perspective, also helps us understand the gendered division of household labor. This perspective 
is based on the view of gender as a “primary cultural frame for organizing social relations” 
(Ridgeway 2009: 147). This theoretical perspective highlights the gendered meanings of 
performance of household labor in relation to gender relations in the family, indicating 
appropriate behaviors and responsibilities for men and women (Bianchi et al. 2000; Doucet 2006; 
                                                             
5 Two other theoretical perspectives include the relative resource perspective and the time availability perspective. 
Since this dissertation is not intended to examine the determinants of division of household labor, I do not provide 
extensive discussion of these two theoretical perspectives. See Coltrane (2000)’s and Lachance-Grzela and 
Bouchard’s (2010) review articles and Toth (2008)’s dissertation on the division of household labor for a 
comprehensive review. 
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Erickson 2005). Using this theoretical perspective, Bianchi et al. (2000: 195) state that women’s 
greater investment in performing household labor reflects female gender norms and expectations 
of competent wives and mothers.  
Sociological research has viewed gender role attitudes as an important correlate of the 
division of labor, both in terms of the number of hours spent on household labor and the 
perceived fairness of the division of household labor. Coltrane’s (2000) extensive review 
suggests that more equal sharing of household labor increases marital satisfaction and reduces 
couples’ experience of conflict. A number of more recent studies also find that women’s 
relationship quality decreases when they perceive the sharing of household labor to be unfair 
(e.g., Frisco and Williams 2003; Mikula, Riederer, and Bodi 2012; Wilcox and Nock 2006). 
Gender role attitudes play a part in this relationship. For instance, Greenstein (1996) finds that 
perceived unfairness of the division of household labor has a stronger negative impact on marital 
quality for wives holding egalitarian gender role attitudes than for wives holding traditional 
attitudes. Greenstein (2009) further consolidates his argument in his comparative study by 
showing that women’s share of household labor negatively influences perceived fairness of the 
division of household labor and women’s family satisfaction. Importantly, these studies highlight 
the special significance of this relationship between the division of household labor and marital 
quality. Amato and his colleagues (2007) also report that husbands’ share of housework has a 
positive effect on women’s marital happiness and has a negative effect on marital problems or 
divorce proneness.  
This theoretical stand may accord with Hakim’s (2000; 2003) preference theory.  Hakim 
(2003: 350) highlights personal values and decision-making at the micro-level and views 
women’s heterogeneity in lifestyle preferences as an explanation of trends in family formation, 
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family arrangements, and fertility rates. Women’s attitudes and values are at the center of 
classifying sociological ideal-types of women’s lifestyle preferences: home-centered, adaptive, 
and work-centered (Hakim 2000). The distribution of the three lifestyle preferences varies by 
societies based on different available options and opportunities for women (e.g., public policies) 
within their given historical and institutional conditions.  
Using data from the 1999 British survey, Hakim (2003: 363) shows that approximately 
40 percent of home-centered women have full-time jobs, while 22 percent of work-centered 
women are not employed. Her findings imply that certain life circumstances, including economic 
necessity, can lead to an inconsistency between personal preferences and actual choices. An 
important insight from the preference theory is that women’s value systems, aspirations, and life 
goals vary – which, in turn, leads to different lifestyle preferences and relatedly different fertility 
decision-making. This point may have an implication for understanding women’s evaluation of 
their marital experiences and fertility decision-making. I will discuss my specific hypotheses 
regarding the relationship between gender role attitudes and the division of household labor in 
chapter 4.  
 
Marital Quality and Fertility 
Family researchers have studied correlates of marital quality since the 1960s. The initial 
areas of research were marital happiness (often also referred to as marital satisfaction) and 
marital stability (Hicks and Platt 1970; Spanier and Lewis 1980). Although researchers employ 
different operational definitions of the quality of marital relationship or marital satisfaction, they 
have increasingly called it “marital quality” (Johnson et al. 1986). As family researchers have 
continuously examined new correlates of marital quality, including demographic and social 
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factors, the quality of marital relationships continues to be a core area in the field (Spanier and 
Lewis 1980). 
The term marital quality has gained greater usage in the literature since it includes 
diverse aspects of marriage which were previously studied as separate dependent variables 
(Spanier and Lewis 1980). Lewis and Spanier (1979) define marital quality as “the subjective 
evaluation of a married couple’s relationship on various dimensions and evaluations” (p. 269), 
which covers marital adjustment, satisfaction, happiness, marital interaction, disagreements, and 
proneness to divorce or separation. Although their scale includes both positive and negative 
dimensions, it is controversial whether these dimensions are conceptually and empirically 
distinct (Sharpley and Cross 1982; Spanier and Thompson 1982). Building upon this approach to 
marital quality as a multidimensional concept, Johnson and his colleagues (1986) proposed five 
components of marital quality, including marital happiness, marital interaction, marital 
disagreement, marital problems, and marital instability. Using confirmatory factor analysis, they 
formed a two-dimensional structure of marital quality: a positive dimension comprised of 
interaction and happiness, and a negative dimension comprised of problems, disagreements, and 
instability. They warn against constructing a summation of elements from the two different 
dimensions since this can obscure the potential relationship between marital quality measures 
and independent variables in the analysis (Johnson et al. 1986: 45). Following Johnson et al.’s 
(1986) study, many empirical studies of marital quality since the late 1980s build upon this 
multidimensional approach to marital quality (e.g., Amato and Booth 1995; Rijken and Liefbroer 
2009).  
Some studies examine fewer dimensions of marital quality, depending on their theoretical 
focus and the availability of data. For instance, Amato and his colleagues (2003) examined the 
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stability of marital quality over time in the U.S. with three marital dimensions: marital happiness, 
marital interaction, and divorce proneness. Furthermore, many studies still focus on one specific 
dimension of marital relationship, such as marital happiness or satisfaction.   
One of the correlates of marital quality that literature has studied extensively is having 
children, or more specifically, the influence of having children on marital quality (e.g., Glenn 
1989; Helms-Erickson 2001; Keizer and Schenk 2012; Kurdek 1999). In their longitudinal study, 
Keizer and Schenk (2012) suggest a U-shaped association between relationship satisfaction and 
the transition to parenthood, meaning couples became less satisfied with their relationship after 
the first birth, but their satisfaction rebounds when the child reaches school age. Surprisingly, 
however, the literature has paid little attention to the opposite mechanism: the influence of 
marital quality on fertility behavior.  
Evidence about the influence of marital quality on fertility is sparse. Previous studies 
examining this relationship mainly focused on the effect of stable relationships on fertility 
(Rijken and Liefbroer 2009; Rijken and Thomson 2011). Research has identified two opposing 
mechanisms in the relationship between relationship stability and fertility. One point of view 
finds that a stable marital relationship increases the chances of having a(nother) child. Put 
differently, marital instability is negatively associated with childbearing. The growth of unstable 
relationships, including high rates of divorce, has brought increased attention to the influence of 
a union’s stability or relationship quality upon childbearing (Balbo et al. 2013). Moreover, in 
contexts in which childbearing decision-making is based upon a couple’s joint decision, stable 
partnerships are considered the most important factor for childbearing (Thornton and Young-
Demarco 2001). Lillard and Waite (1993) hypothesized that couples who are likely to separate 
are more likely to delay childbearing, and this postponement also leads to longer birth intervals. 
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Couples perceive that having children will increase the cost of marital dissolution, so couples 
with higher levels of marital instability are less likely to have a child. Lillard and Waite’s (1993) 
and Myers’ (1997) findings support this theoretical stance.  
Conversely, building on the rational choice model of fertility, Friedman, Hechter and 
Kanazawa 1994) propose that union instability is positively associated with childbearing since 
having children is a method of reducing uncertainty within marriage and enhancing marital 
solidarity in developed societies. They assume that rational couples seek to reduce uncertainty in 
their marriage by having a child, thereby increasing spouses’ dependence on each other and 
improving marital solidarity. They take into account the risk of divorce as an example of 
uncertainty in the marriage and conceptualize marital solidarity as the multi-stranded quality of 
the relationship based on financial ties, occupational ties, and ties of common interest (Friedman 
et al. 1994: 386).  
As mentioned above, reviewed studies mainly focused on the role of marital (in)stability 
on the likelihood of childbearing (Rijken and Liefbroer 2009). However, studies based on social-
psychological perspectives have suggested that marital quality is a multidimensional concept and 
marital stability is but a single aspect of the marital relationship (e.g., Amato and Booth 1997; 
Bradbury, Fincham, and Beach 2000; Johnson et al. 1986). Drawing on the multidimensional 
approach to marital quality, more recent studies examine the relationship between marital quality 
and fertility and suggest a more complicated relationship between the two. Using data for Dutch 
couples, for instance, Rijken and Liefbroer (2009) measured marital quality as a 
multidimensional concept, including positive and negative interaction, value consensus, and 
separation proneness. They provided evidence of the curvilinear relationship between marital 
quality and the timing of births. Couples were most likely to give birth when they experienced a 
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medium-quality relationship (i.e., having neither excessively negative nor excessively positive 
interactions) with partners. 
With these theoretical perspectives in mind, in chapter 4, I investigate the link between 
the division of household labor and women’s satisfaction with it, depending on women’s gender 
ideology. I further ask if an inconsistency between lifestyle preferences and actual lifestyle 
choices has a significant effect on women’s marital quality and the likelihood of having a child.  
 
The Gap between Fertility Attitudes and Fertility Behavior 
A large body of literature focuses on the difference between fertility attitudes and behavior in 
both high and low fertility settings. Traditionally, in high fertility settings, demographers have 
studied the unmet need for contraception, which refers to “the discrepancy between women’s 
fertility preferences and contraceptive use”, indicating that actual fertility is often higher than 
stated fertility preferences (Bradley and Casterline 2014:124). In low fertility settings, evidence 
suggests the persistence of two-child family ideals, even in countries that have recently shifted to 
very low fertility. There is a mismatch between stated fertility preferences and observed actual 
fertility in many contemporary developed countries, beginning with countries in Europe. This 
mismatch is referred to as unmet demand for children (Harknett and Hartnett 2014). Literature 
on low fertility documents that intended family size is higher than completed cohort fertility 
(Bongaarts 2002) as well as the period TFR (Hagewen and Morgan 2005).  
Scholars assert that fertility intentions reflect a more concrete element of the respondents’ 
decision-making process and their plans for action than their fertility preferences or attitudes 
(Hin et al. 2011). However, studies also suggest the disjunction between fertility intentions and 
fertility behavior. Harknett and Hartnett (2014) suggest that approximately 60 percent of 
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intended births are realized, based on data from 22 European countries.
6
 Furthermore, Harknett 
and Hartnett (2014) find heterogeneity in women’s fertility aspirations even across low fertility 
countries. In Southern Europe, shaped by long-term low fertility and low gender equity regimes, 
women were far less likely to realize their fertility intentions. Long-term low fertility and low 
gender equity regimes led to the intended family size of less than two in Spain and Italy (Testa 
2007), and in Germany as well (Harknett and Hartnett 2014).  
Some countries, such as the United States, indicate a close correspondence between 
fertility intentions and actual fertility at the aggregate level. Does this mean women and men in 
these countries are able to achieve their fertility intentions? Using data from the NLSY79, 
Morgan and Rackin (2010) find that only approximately 40 percent of women realized their 
fertility intentions, and underachieving is more common than overachieving fertility intentions in 
the U.S. What factors facilitate or inhibit realizing fertility intentions? 
A strong theoretical framework for the study of fertility intentions in demographic studies 
is the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) (Ajzen 1988; Ajzen and Fishbein 2005). The TPB 
posits that childbearing is a purposeful behavior that is positively dependent on fertility 
intentions. Attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral controls function as the 
determinants of fertility intentions. Drawing this theory, studies concerning the relationship 
between fertility intentions and fertility behavior investigate the predictive power of fertility 
intentions (e.g., Liefbroer 2008; Quesnel-Vallée and Morgan 2003; Spéder and Kapitány 2009). 
While the TPB highlights the relationship between fertility intentions and fertility behavior, the 
theory also provides a link between personal characteristics and contextual factors – reflecting 
institutional policy – and fertility intentions and behavior (Ajzen and Klobas 2013). Bongaarts 
                                                             
6  All except for Turkey (TFR of 2.2) have fertility below replacement level (1.25 to 1.96).  
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(2001) also proposes an integrated theoretical framework focusing on the role of proximate 
factors, including age at childbearing, child mortality, and competing preferences, etc., which 
either enhance or reduce fertility relative to a desired family size. Bongaarts views the desired 
family size as the most influential determinant of fertility.  
 
Determinants of fertility 
Empirical evidence concerning determinants of fertility suggests mixed findings about 
the role of personal characteristics, including demographic and socioeconomic factors. There are 
contradictory results concerning whether women’s education facilitates or inhibits realizing 
fertility intentions. In high gender equity regimes such as the Netherlands and France, highly 
educated women are more likely to realize their fertility intentions for a second child (Balbo and 
Mills 2011; Testa and Toulemon 2006), whereas highly educated women are less likely to meet 
their preferred fertility goals in low gender equity regimes such as the U.S. (e.g., Morgan and 
Rackin 2010). In addition to education, other demographic and socioeconomic variables 
associated with the realization of fertility intentions include age, employment (Spéder and 
Kapitány 2009) and sib-ship size (Balbo and Mills 2011). Compared to older women, younger 
women are more likely to realize their fertility intentions in Europe (Harknett and Hartnett 2014). 
Hungarian working women are more likely to realize their fertility intentions relative to having 
an unintended birth (Spéder and Kapitány 2009). A large family of origin (i.e., sib-ship size) 
positively affects higher fertility aspirations for a second child (Balbo and Mills 2011).  
Parity is an important factor in determining fertility realization. The rationales behind 
having one child versus having subsequent children are typically viewed as qualitatively 
different. Affective reasons may account for having a first child, while additional children relate 
23 
 
to “family building” (Bulatao 1981). Once people have children, especially people at parity two 
or higher, they are more likely to abandon additional fertility intentions (Spéder and Kapitány 
2009). In low fertility studies, second births serve as a critical decision point, because having two 
children is normative in industrialized countries (Goldscheider et al. 2013; Morgan 2003; Torr 
and Short 2004). What do we know about the correspondence between fertility attitudes and 
fertility behavior in a context characterized by a rapid fertility decline coupled with a strong 
normative ideal of the two-child family? These individual characteristics may play different roles 
in shaping fertility aspirations and realization in a different context of gender equity and the 
family. Moreover, having a second child may be a critical decision in a context in which high 
emphasis on children’s education is normative. I will discuss the contextual importance in the 
research setting section. 
 
RESEARCH SETTING 
 
Fertility Decline and its correlates in South Korea, 1965-1984   
The decline in fertility rates in South Korea was dramatic in terms of both speed and sheer 
magnitude. Figure 1 illustrates the trend in TFR and GDP per capita in South Korea from 1965 to 
2013. The South Korean government played an important role in fertility decline. Induced 
abortion was frequently practiced in urban areas in the 1960s as a method of birth control, and 
women’s age at marriage continued to increase (Kim 2005; Kwon and Kim 2002). The TFR in 
South Korea was 5.6 in 1965, a few years after the Korean government launched the National 
Family Planning Program in 1962 to reduce the levels of unwanted fertility and the desired 
family size (Choe and Park 2006; Choe and Retherford 2009; Tsuya et al. 2009).  
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The National Family Planning Program was a part of First (1962-1966) and Second 
(1967-1971) Five-Year Economic Development Plans, which spread the ideas that having a 
smaller family offers a better life and a more affluent country. The GDP per capita in South 
Korea increased from 104 USD in 1962 to 317 USD in 1971 and to 2,542 UDS in 1985, as 
Figure 1 depicts. In corresponding to socioeconomic changes since the early 1960s, the TFR in 
South Korea reached its replacement-level by early 1980’s. South Korea is viewed as a 
representative case showing dramatic economic development within a relatively short period of 
time, as represented by the rapid growth in the GDP per capita over time. This rapid economic 
development, in turn, led to rapid industrialization and urbanization. Chang (2010) 
conceptualizes this whole process as compressed modernity, characterized by the coexistence of 
mutually disparate historic and social elements. Compressed modernity is a “condition in which 
economic, political, social, and/or cultural changes occur in an extremely condensed manner in 
respect to both time and space” (Chang and Song 2010: 544). Classical understanding of fertility 
decline, such as demographic transition theory or Caldwell’s wealth flows theory, may well 
explain the fertility decline from the 1960s to the 1980s as society became industrialized and 
urbanized: the old family structure had dissolved, and this in turn made high fertility irrational 
(Notestein 1953; Caldwell 1982). 
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Figure 1Total period fertility rates and GDP per capita, South Korea, 1965-2010 
 
Source: Korean Statistical Information Service, World Bank 
 
Fertility Decline and its correlates in South Korea, 1985- present 
The TFR descended below replacement fertility in the two decades following 1965, and the 
decline did not stop until 2005 when South Korea recorded its lowest-ever fertility rate of 1.1.  
Since the mid-1980s, there is a notable change in terms of the relationship between fertility 
attitudes and actual behavior. Figure 2 illustrates that there is a mismatch between the ideal 
number of children and the period total fertility rate, except for the year of 1982. Before 1982, 
the ideal number of children was higher than the average number of children that women would 
expect to have throughout her childbearing years. The ideal number of children stays 
approximately 2 children or slightly higher than 2 children throughout the observed years since 
1985. On the contrary, the fertility rate continued to decline to near 1.1 in 2005 and currently 
stands at a mere 1.3 in 2012. Meanwhile, the South Korean government continued to strengthen 
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its family planning programs to promote the one-child family as the ideal size during the 1980s, 
and the government abandoned that anti-natalist policy in 1988 (Tsuya et al. 2009). Korea's 
population policy eventually switched toward pronatalist in 2004 and announced the First Basic 
Plan for Low Fertility and Aged Society in 2006 (Jones 2011).  
 
Figure 2 Trends in married women 15-44 perceived ideal number of children (average) and the 
TFR, South Korea, 1970-2012 
 
Source: Korean Statistical Information Service 
 
In South Korea, education is one of the top priority tasks of family since education is 
viewed as a best means of upward social mobility and economic prosperity (Park, Byun, and 
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Survey conducted in South Korea in 2012. As such, South Korea exhibits very high levels of 
human development, based on international rankings such as the Human Development Index 
(HDI). Moreover, parents are expected to produce “high quality” children via immoderate 
investment in childhood education, driven by the competitive economic environment, especially 
since the 1997 economic crisis (Anderson and Kohler 2013; Eun 2007). All these conditions 
contribute to increasing investments needed for children and the necessity of work due to the 
rising cost of living. 
The cost of education produces more economic and social pressure for South Korean 
parents than any other cost. Recently, for example, Statistics Korea reported that in Seoul, about 
8 out of 10 parents with children in primary or secondary education feel economic pressure due 
to the cost of their children’s education.7 The economic pressure perceived by parents 
corresponds to the percentage of students receiving at least one kind of private education in the 
primary and the secondary schools. According to the 2014 Private Education Expenditure Survey 
conducted by Statistics Korea, approximately 70% of students in primary school, middle school, 
or high school participated in at least one kind of private education (Statistics Korea 2015). The 
total amount of money spent by these students’ parents for their children’s private education was 
slightly over 18 trillion Korean Won (approximately $15 billion USD) (Statistics Korea 2015). In 
turn, this is equivalent to spending approximately $200 USD on children’s private education per 
month. Although the amount of money spent per student for private education has slightly 
decreased since 2007, these figures are relatively conservative.  
Rising incomes and gains in female educational attainment have occurred at the same 
time as rising female participation in the labor force. Female labor force participation in South 
Korea has been on the rise over the past three decades, from 37.2% in 1965 to 50% in 2013 
                                                             
7 http://news.mk.co.kr/newsRead.php?year=2013&no=297221 (Retrieved in May 7, 2013).  
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(KOSIS 2015). Since the female labor force participation rate reached 50% in 2005, it has been 
stagnant. South Korea does show lower rates of female labor force participation than the average 
for OECD, characterized by an M-shaped curve. Figure 3 depicts the M-shaped curve of the 
female labor force participation in 2000 and 2013. The female labor force participation rate was 
49.2% in 2000 and 50% in 2013. The overall rate is not substantially different. A large 
proportion of women leave the labor force upon marriage and the birth of their first child, 
rejoining the labor market when their children reach school age (age 7). As children begin formal 
schooling, women may need to rejoin the labor market either to pursue their individual careers or 
from economic need (including the costly support of their children’s education).     
 
Figure 3 Female labor force participation rate by age group, South Korea, 2000, 2013 
 
Source: Korean Statistical Information Service 
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Certain factors contribute to the M-shaped curve of the female labor force participation 
rate and its stagnant aggregate-level rates. Strong beliefs in gendered childcare expectations and 
the absence of childcare facilities yield the M-shaped female labor force participation, as women 
are forced to drop out of the labor market while children are young (Eun 2007). Strong beliefs in 
gendered childcare expectations are embedded in historically rooted unequal patriarchal gender 
relations. Unequal divisions of labor within the family reflect strong traditional gender role 
expectations. Findings based on the 2009 Korean Time Use Survey reveal that, among dual-
earner couples, women do 4.2 times as much housework and childcare as their husbands (Lee 
2014). Neither women’s contribution to household income nor their gender role attitudes are 
shown to increase husbands’ contributions to housework or childcare (Lee 2014). In comparison, 
countries with egalitarian gender relations reveal substantially different results in terms of time 
spent on unpaid domestic work by gender. For instance, Dutch women spend 2.4 times more and 
Australian women spend 1.8 times more on unpaid domestic work than their male counterparts, 
respectively (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2003). 
The absence of childcare facilities is an example of weak institutional support for 
balancing work and family. Studies examining very low fertility in East Asia argue that the 
current social institutions– including family and the workplace– do not create family- and child-
friendly environments, and this institutional condition is largely attributable to very low fertility 
(Chang 2003; Chung 2009; Eun 2007; Frejka et al. 2010; Jones 2011; Kim 2005). Notably, South 
Korea shows higher participation rates for children aged 0-2 in formal childcare and pre-school 
services than other East Asian countries, such as Japan or Taiwan
8
. According to the OECD 
                                                             
8 In Taiwan, the main type of childcare arrangement is informal care. Approximately 66% of married Taiwanese 
women aged 15-64 years take care of their children by themselves, and 26% of married Taiwanese women rely on 
their relatives’ help (Source: eng.stat.gov.tw/public/Attachment/762514403371.xls).  
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Family Database (2015), in Japan, participation rates for children aged 0-2 in formal childcare 
and pre-school services increased by just under 4 percentage points, from 22.5% in 2006 to 25.9% 
in 2013.
9
 In contrast, the participation rates in South Korea increased by 23.2 percentage points, 
from 10.9% to 34.1%, showing the largest increase among OECD countries between 2006 and 
2013. However, this percentage is still much lower than social democratic countries in Europe 
with supportive family policies, such as Denmark (67%) or Norway (54.3%).  
While the M-shaped curve in female labor force participation indicates the difficulty for 
women of staying in the labor force due to the incompatibility between work and family, there is 
an apparent glass ceiling for women in the labor market. When compared with other OECD 
countries, South Korea shows the highest gender wage gap (37.5%) among full-time employees. 
This gender wage gap is even 1.37 times higher than that of Japan, a country indicating one of 
the highest gender wage gaps among OECD countries (UNDP 2011). As such, gender equality in 
South Korea is very low, ranking 117
th
 out of 142 countries, based on the Global Gender Gap 
Index levels across 2006-2010 (World Economic Forum, 2010).
10
 
The increase in female labor force participation has led to increasing trends in age-at-
first-marriage. This trend is crucial for determining the fertility rate in South Korea, where 
marriage is a strongly held social norm for childbearing (Eun 2003; 2007). Figure 4 demonstrates 
that the age-at-first-marriage for both males and females gradually increased between 1990 and 
2012, from 27.8 to 32.1 for males and from 24.8 to 29.4 for females, respectively (KOSIS 2015). 
As the age-at-first marriage has continuously increased, the percentage of people in each gender 
and age group who have been married at least once has also changed.  
                                                             
9 Formal services generally include center-based services, organized daycare and pre-school (both public and private) 
and professional childminders; while they exclude informal services provided by relatives, friends, or neighbors 
(OECD Family Database 2015).  
10 In comparison, China ranked at 87th, and Japan ranked at 104th.  
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Figure 4 Trend in indicators of marriage and fertility in South Korea, 1990-2012 
 
    Source: Korean Statistical Information Service 
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2012). A similar pattern is observed among men, but the trend in postponement of marriage is 
clearer for them than it is for women. By 2005, the percentage of ever-married men aged 25-29 
had decreased from 57% (in 1970) to a mere 18%. Meanwhile, in 2005, the percentage of ever-
married men aged 30-34 remained at 59% – down from 93% in 1970. By age 44, 92% of men 
have been married at least once, a percentage that is lower than that of women in the same age 
bracket.  
 
Figure 5 Percentage of ever-married men and women by age group, 1970-2005 
 
   Source: Korean Statistical Information Service  
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intervals are relatively short. As Figure 4 indicates, the difference in age at marriage and at the 
birth of the first child has been no more than 1.5 years throughout the measured periods. The 
spacing between first and second births has not exceeded three years since 2002, and presently 
the average interval between first and second births is 1.9 years (Statistics Korea 2013). The 
length of transition between having the first child and having a second child is critical because 
parents must consider whether they are willing and able to invest the time, effort, and money for 
the education and care of a second child.   
Low fertility and (related) population ageing are high-priority issues for the government, 
along with strengthening the role of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family to develop and 
implement policies for gender equality, prompting the establishment of the Saeromaji Plan in 
2006.
11
 South Korea gives working mothers the right to 12.9 weeks (90 days) of maternity leave, 
and the first 60 days of maternity leave are paid. Parental childcare leave has been gradually 
extended from working parents of a child under the age of 1 in 1995 to working parents of a 
child under the age of 3 in 2007, to working parents of a child under the age of 6 in 2010 and to 
working parents of a child under the age of 8 in 2012.The income-replacement rate is 40% with a 
maximum of 1,000,000 Korean Won (approximately $850 USD). South Korea spends 
approximately 1% of GDP for public spending on family benefits (OECD, 2013). Table 1 
provides information on the current parental leave policies and public spending on family 
benefits in selected countries. Although both working mother and fathers have had the right to 
12-month childcare leave since 1995, few fathers take childcare leave. The proportion of male 
workers taking childcare leave was less than 5% of all workers taking childcare leave in 2014 
(Statistics Korea 2015).   
                                                             
11 Saeromaji plan is a policy initiative established during the Lee Myung-Bak administration to address income 
polarization. Areas of focus include employment, education, childcare, and welfare (Government of Korea 2006).   
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And yet, public spending on family benefits in South Korea is a mere 1% of the GDP, the 
lowest among 33 OECD countries (OECD 2013). Public spending on family benefits refers to 
financial support for families and children including child-related cash transfers to families with 
children, public spending on services for families with children, and financial support for 
families provided through the tax system (OECD 2012). On average, OECD countries spend 2.6% 
of their GDP on family benefits, with substantial variations across countries. Public spending in 
this area for South Korea is a mere 1% of the GDP, which is the lowest among 33 OECD 
countries. Nordic European countries have the highest public spending on family benefits, near 4% 
of the GDP.  
 
Table 1 Public support for families in selected countries 
 
Total paid 
leave for 
mothers1)2) 
Average 
payment rate3) 
(%)  
Paid leave 
reserved for 
fathers1) 
Average 
payment rate3) 
(%)  
Public spending 
on family 
benefits
3)
 
Italy 47.7 52.7  0.2 100  2.01 
Japan 58.0 61.6  52.0 58.4  1.74 
Norway 87 42  14.0 90.8  3.20 
Sweden 60 63.4  10.0 75.6  3.64 
South 
Korea 64.9 40.1  52.6 31.0  1.16 
OECD 
average 53.7 59.2  9.0 65.1  2.55 
1) Figures refer to the entitled weeks of paid leave as of April 2014.   
2) Total paid leave for mothers includes maternity leave and parental and home care leave available to mothers. 
3) The average payment rate is the proportion of gross earnings replaced by the benefits over the length of the paid 
leave for a person with average earnings.  
3) Public spending on family benefits refers to financial support for families and children, including child-related 
cash transfers to families with children, public spending on services for families with children, and financial support 
for families as provided through the tax system. Presented in percent of GDP, 2011. 
Source: Social Expenditure Database preliminary data  (www.oecd.org/social/expenditure.htm), September 2014 
 
In brief, South Korea has yet to successfully develop gender equitable institutional 
supports to lessen the conflict between work and family roles. It appears that the rising cost of 
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living, increasing investments needed for children, women’s roles as the main caregivers in their 
households, and the lack of institutional support for children and family create difficulties in 
balancing the demands of work and family. This incompatibility between work and family is one 
of the key elements explaining very low fertility rates with low female labor force participation 
at the national level. South Korea might be one of the countries in this category. This 
positionality of the case of South Korea in the literature leads to my core research question: How 
can the theoretical link between gender equity and fertility be expanded to highlight the 
importance of gender equity in understanding fertility variations within a country? 
South Korea is an excellent case study for expanding our understanding of the 
relationship between gender equity and fertility. Evidence suggests that gender equity positively 
affects fertility aspirations and behaviors, especially in countries with low gender equity regimes. 
However, studies emphasizing the effects on fertility of overwhelming role conflicts among 
South Korean women have yet to identify the best measures of gender equity, instead relying 
upon the gender division of household labor alone. More systematic research examining gender 
equity and fertility in South Korea could broaden our understanding of the relationship between 
gender equity and fertility because the institutional and cultural backgrounds for gender equity in 
both public and private spheres in South Korea are substantially different from those in Europe 
or North America. Moreover, understanding of the relatively recent shift to the persistent very 
low fertility rate in South Korea (often also referred to as lowest-low fertility) requires further 
investigation, given that the two-child family ideal persists among South Korean men and 
women. There is a substantial gulf between the two-child family ideal and the actual fertility rate. 
If low fertility in South Korea is not yet solidly institutionalized (given the relatively recent shift 
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to lowest-low fertility and the persistence of a two-child family ideal), there may be a possibility 
of exiting the lowest-low fertility category. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to integrate the case of South Korea as a critical case for theoretical 
understanding of the impact of gender equity, I focus on three sets of related research questions. 
In the first set of questions I ask whether family supportive environments for egalitarian gender 
relations matter with regard to fertility in South Korea, and I also look at sources of family 
supportive environments and how they work in increasing fertility. These questions form the 
basis for Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, I examine whether perceptions of gender equity within the 
family influence the realization of fertility desires within the context of institutional gender 
inequality, whether indications of higher gender equity in the family always have a positive 
impact on the realization of fertility intentions in low fertility countries, and whether this is true 
even in countries experiencing a relatively recent transition to low fertility and low gender equity 
regimes. Finally, in Chapter 4, I ask whether gender equity in the family affects marital quality, 
how they work for each other, and whether marital quality positively affects fertility.  
 
PLAN OF THE RESEARCH 
Data 
To answer my research questions, I use three waves of data from the Korean Longitudinal 
Survey of Women & Families. The Korean Longitudinal Survey of Women & Families (KLoWF) 
is an ongoing data collection effort of the Korean Women’s Development Institute. Initiated in 
2007 (Wave 1), with publically available data for Wave 2 (2008) and Wave 3 (2010), the 
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KLoWF provides data uniquely suited to the empirical testing of the associations between gender 
equity, family, and fertility history. The KLoWF offers an exceptional opportunity to follow 
women’s experiences, family contexts, and attitudinal changes over time, with detailed 
information regarding family type, family relationships, attitudes toward gender roles, and family 
values.  
Based on multi-stage stratified sampling, a total of 9,068 households, containing 9,997 
women between the ages of 19 and 64, were surveyed in Wave 1. A total of 7,031 respondents 
participated in all three waves of the study currently available. Questions concerning fertility 
intentions are limited to currently married women, younger than 45, with at least one birth 
experience. Within this group, I further restrict my analyses to married mothers of parity 1, under 
the age of 40, who responded to fertility intentions at Wave 1. I then trace fertility-related 
responses for this sub-sample across Wave 2 and Wave 3 with all valid responses for 
multivariate models for each substantive chapter. Calculations are adjusted for the PSU, and 
individual weights are employed in the bivariate and multivariate analyses.  
The longitudinal nature of these data allows me to examine individual changes associated 
with key life transitions (i.e., transitions to a second birth) over the course of a three-year period. 
Three years is not enough to fully examine the realization of all desired second births, but it 
provides a sufficient number of years given the short intervals between first and second births.  
 
Chapter outline 
Guided by the literature discussed in this chapter, I present the empirical findings of the analysis 
in Chapters 2 through 4. In Chapter 2, I address intriguing questions about the role of 
institutional support in shaping individual fertility attitudes and behavior in South Korea. 
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Previous studies examining transnational comparison of fertility suggests that countries with 
weak institutional support for work-family balance indicate very low fertility. Building on this 
literature I ask whether, in a context with weak institutional support as well as very low fertility 
(such as South Korea), institutional support fails to positively influence individual fertility. What 
are other sources of family supportive environments, and do they work for fertility? I use logistic 
regression models to test associations between three sources of family supportive environments 
and women’s fertility intentions and fertility behavior concerning a second child. In Chapter 3, I 
address more specifically the influence of gender equity in the family on the realization of 
fertility intentions. I integrate an additional aspect of gender equity in the family suited in the 
specific context of high educational aspirations, into the conventional approach to household-
level gender equity. I then use logistic regression models to test the impact of gender equity in 
the family on the realization of fertility intentions for a second child. In Chapter 4, I explore 
issues of relationship between gender equity and marital quality. Marital experience is highly 
dependent on gender relations within the marriage, and it can further affect fertility decision-
making. I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models and logistic regression models to 
test these relationships.  
 The concluding chapter (Chapter 5) provides a final summary of the research findings 
and an evaluation of their contributions to theories of low fertility. I summarize the main findings, 
focusing on core research questions that I addressed in the introduction chapter. These findings 
contribute to theories of low fertility by linking potential sources of family supportive 
environments given the weak institutional support for family balance. Furthermore, the findings 
shed light on theories of low fertility by highlighting the importance of increased male 
participation in housework and childcare as well as educational responsibilities for children for 
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higher marital quality and for couples’ reproductive goals. I conclude by suggesting future areas 
for research and policy implications.  
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CHAPTER 2  
THE INFLUENCE OF SUPPORTIVE ENVIRONMENTS FOR FAMILY  
ON WOMEN’S FERTILITY INTENTIONS AND BEHAVIOR12 
 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a great deal of heterogeneity in fertility levels across advanced countries, as scholars 
have observed an upturn in total fertility rates in Western countries in the past decade (Goldstein, 
Sobotka, and Jasilionience 2009; Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari 2009). In addition, the 
relationship between trends in female labor force participation and fertility trends has changed 
from negative to positive at the national level in the 1990s (e.g., Brewster and Rindfuss 2000; 
Del Boca 2002; Morgan 2003; Rindfuss et al. 2007). However, East Asian countries, such as 
South Korea (hereafter Korea) and Japan, continue to be exceptions to this recent rebound in 
fertility levels. Scholars suggest that both the upturn in Western countries and the consistent, 
very low fertility in East Asia relate to the compatibility between parenthood and labor force 
participation (Mills et al. 2011; Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari 2011). A great deal of research 
examining the relationship between fertility and family emphasizes the role of institutions, 
through such means as family policies, to achieve egalitarian gender roles and relations, enabling 
women to balance work and family (e.g., Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015; Gauthier 2007; 
Thévenon 2011). 
In a comparative study, Thévenon (2011) examines the cross-national variation in state 
support to families, using data from the OECD family database. His analysis reveals that state 
support to families in Southern European countries, Japan, and Korea are characterized by a 
deficit of policies enabling the work and family balance. Korea is even markedly different from 
the countries in the same group with similar levels of state support to families, indicating that it 
                                                             
12 A revised version of this chapter appears in Demographic Research.  
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“clearly lag[s] behind the other OECD countries, whichever type of support is considered” 
(Thévenon 2011:64). 
Since some countries do not provide strong state support to families due to their 
institutional regimes, individuals may require support from other sources, including male 
partners or family networks (Balbo and Mills 2011). Literature linking gender equity and fertility 
at the micro level highlights that male partners’ participation in housework and childcare 
positively affects women’s fertility intentions, especially within low gender equity institutional 
contexts (Mills et al. 2008; Olàh 2003). Scholars have recently explored the effect of support 
from grandparental childcare on fertility as a potential source of supportive environments to 
improve the compatibility between work and family (Hank and Buber 2009; Thomese and 
Liefbroer 2013). However, previous studies often investigated a single source of supportive 
environments for family: the state, male partners, or extended family and its impact on fertility 
(Harknett, Billari, and Medalia 2014). 
Given this background, the goal of this chapter is to fill in the gap in the literature by 
examining the influence of three sources of supportive environments for family on women’s 
intended and actual fertility behavior for a second child. I situate the Korean case in broader 
discussions on the nuanced relationships between access to family support and fertility within a 
context lacking institutional support for childrearing embedded in low levels of gender equality. 
Using data from the three waves of the Korean Longitudinal Survey of Women & Families from 
2007 to 2010, I examine whether supportive environments for family, including institutions, 
male partners’ participation in housework and childcare, and grandparental childcare assistance, 
influence fertility intentions and fertility behavior for married women with one child. My 
analysis focuses on second births, given the cultural context of the rapid transition to first birth 
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within the first years of marriage in Korea as I discussed in Chapter 1. Moreover, it enables me 
to examine the impact of existing childcare support from three sources of supportive 
environments for family for second births (Thomese and Liefbroer 2013). 
I begin with discussing previous studies on this topic in order to draw hypotheses 
focusing on a deeper understanding of the process that links the family supportive environments 
with fertility intentions and behavior. I then introduce my analytic sample, measures, and 
methods used in this chapter. Starting with a descriptive analysis of the sample, I conduct a set of 
logistic regression analyses of women’s fertility intentions and fertility behavior for a second 
child. I conclude with a reflection on my findings.    
 
PREVIOUS STUDIES & HYPOTHESES 
Changing female gender roles, support from institutions, and fertility 
As I reviewed in Chapter 1, studies on low fertility during the past decade have emphasized the 
incompatibility of the roles of mothers and workers as an explanation of the national emergence 
of low fertility and have viewed it as a major obstacle to fertility recovery. Several scholars 
explain this evidence by emphasizing the role of social institutions (i.e., family policy regimes) 
providing support to the family, enabling compatibility between work and family, reflecting new 
expectations towards gender-egalitarian family norms for pro-family outcomes, such as 
achieving the desired number of children (Chésnais 1996; McDonald 2000, 2013; Thévenon 
2011). 
 State family policies, including cash benefits or childcare arrangements, can reduce the 
conflict between work and family for women, and their effects on fertility vary by country. In her 
review of the literature linking policies and fertility, Gauthier (2007) suggests mixed findings 
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about the impact of policies on fertility. Importantly, however, her review reveals that evidence 
based on the micro-level data support for a small positive impact of policies on fertility and those 
impacts are varying by country and parity. Moreover, the impact of institutional childcare 
arrangements tends to be lower without changes in gender equality or changes in other factors 
influencing achieving women’ desired family size, such as support from husbands (McDonald 
2002; Rindfuss et al. 2010). 
 As I briefly discussed in Chapter 1, public support of families in Korea, and East Asia 
more broadly, is limited based on cross-national analyses of those in other OECD countries 
(Thévenon 2011). Likewise, McDonald (2008) argues that very low fertility across East Asia 
indicates failing social models in East Asia based on traditional models of family receiving little 
or no assistance from the state. Yet, it is not clear whether social policies have an impact on 
variations in fertility within a country with limited state support. Do social policies have positive 
impact on individual fertility in Korea as they do in the Scandinavia countries? Or do they have 
no significant impact on individual fertility? Specifically, do they significantly impact on fertility 
intentions and/or behavior? These remaining questions lead me to posit my first set of 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1a: Support from institutions has a positive effect on women’s fertility 
intentions for second children. 
Hypothesis 1b: Support from institutions has a positive effect on women’s giving birth to 
second children. 
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Support from husbands and fertility 
Childbearing can seriously limit women’s labor market opportunities unless women have access 
to supportive environments for childbearing and childrearing. Family sociologists linking low 
fertility to the role conflict between mothers and workers focus on the importance of support 
from husbands in terms of housework or childcare (e.g., Goldscheider et al. 2013, 2015; Torr and 
Short 2004). Empirical studies building upon the gender equity theory at the micro level suggest 
that greater gender equity in the family, reflected in support from husbands in terms of 
housework or childcare, positively influences women’s fertility attitudes or behavior (e.g., Cooke 
2009; Mills et al. 2008; Olàh 2003; Tazi-Preve, Bichlbauer, and Goujon 2004; Neyer, Lappegård, 
and Vignoli 2013; Torr and Short 2004).  
Olàh (2003) supports a positive influence of more equal sharing of housework and 
childcare on the likelihood of fertility intentions for second children in Hungary. Likewise, Mills 
et al. (2008) find that Italian women doing more than 75% of the housework tend to have lower 
fertility intentions for second children among women with one child. Tazi-Preve, Bichlbauer, 
and Goujon (2004) provide interesting evidence from Austria that men sharing household duties 
(egalitarian partnerships) are more likely to intend to have a(nother) child than men living in 
traditional partnerships. Evidence based on the data from the United States (Torr and Short 2004) 
and from Italy (Cooke 2009) support the positive influence of more equal division of housework 
on the transition to a second birth. These results provide strong support for the positive impact of 
gender equity in the family on fertility intentions and outcomes. Also, many of these studies, 
with the exception of those in the United States, are characterized by relatively low female labor 
force participation and very low fertility, with limited public support of families. Since public 
support of families is weak and limited (e.g., a lack of childcare support), support from male 
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partners may have a strong positive impact on fertility. This leads me to develop my second set 
of hypotheses. 
H2a: Support from husbands in terms of housework and childcare has a positive effect on 
women’s fertility intentions for second children. 
H2b: Support from husbands in terms of housework and childcare has a positive effect on 
women’s giving birth to second children. 
 
Supports from grandparents and fertility 
In a country with limited public support of families, greater gender equality in the family is 
necessary through increased male involvement in the home to improve the compatibility between 
roles for work and family. Additionally, people generally have low levels of trust toward non-
familial institutions in contexts where there is weak state support to families and strong 
familialism (Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015). What other sources of support for families can 
people utilize from their networks? While studies of low fertility emphasize institutional 
interventions and a more equal division of household labor for better fertility outcomes, they pay 
relatively less attention to the role of grandparents. Parents’ need for childcare depends on the 
institutional context, such as the availability of formal childcare (Balbo and Mills 2011; Hank 
and Kreyenfeld 2003; Philipov et al. 2006). When the state and other relevant social institutions 
do not provide appropriate support for people in need, and especially when those non-familial 
institutions receive very low levels of trust, parents need to seek other sources of childcare 
support or purchase it.  
Bengtson (2001:6) emphasizes the increasing importance of multigenerational bonds for 
individual well-being and support over the life course given the longer years of “shared lives” 
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between generations, emphasizing the role of grandparents in contemporary families, including 
raising grandchildren. Evidence suggests that grandparents’ involvement in childcare has 
doubled over the last decade in Taiwan (Tsai et al. 2011). Grandparents’ childcare support helps 
parents to combine their roles in work and the family (Hoppmann and Klumb 2010). Recent 
fertility studies concerning the family network as a source of childcare support point to the 
impact of childcare support from extended family on fertility intentions or outcomes (e.g., Balbo 
and Mills 2011; Bühler and Philipov 2005; Tanskanen and Rotkirch 2014). 
Evidence from Continental and Eastern Europe emphasizes the positive impact of support 
from extended family on fertility intentions. Using Bulgarian data, Bühler and Philipov (2005) 
find that the availability of substantive resources from the extended family and more reciprocal 
relationships with family members increases the likelihood of fertility intentions for second 
children. Similarly, Hank and Kreyenfeld (2003) find that childcare support from grandparents 
increases the likelihood of having a first child in Germany, although their measure was rather 
indirect, focusing on the geographic proximity of grandparents. Bühler and Frątczak (2007) also 
suggest that the more respondents receive monetary or non-monetary support from personal 
networks, the more likely they are to intend to have second children in Poland. Using data from 
the Netherlands, Thomése and her colleagues find that grandparental childcare increases the 
likelihood of additional childbirths and they view grandparental childcare as an emerging 
reproductive strategy (Kaptijn et al. 2010; Thomése and Liefbroer 2013). 
Based on a cross-national comparison of grandparental childcare in 10 countries in 
Continental Europe, Hank and Buber (2009) address an important point that variations in the 
prevalence and intensity of childcare support from grandparents correspond to the family policy 
regimes. How does the impact of support from grandparents on women’s fertility attitudes and 
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behaviors play out differently in a context with weak support from the state and from husbands? 
Chu, Kim, and Tsay (2014) find a positive relationship between living with in-laws and the 
timing of first births within marriage in Taiwan. Co-residence with parents or in-laws may 
provide a higher probability of receiving childcare support from them, but this leaves open the 
question of how the actual support transfers between generations. In addition, a limitation of 
previous studies is that they gave no consideration to other sources of support to families when 
they examined the influence of childcare support from grandparents. 13 Would childcare support 
from grandparents increase women’s fertility intentions and behaviors for second children, even 
controlling for other sources of family support? This led to my third set of hypotheses: 
H3a: Support from grandparents has a positive effect on women’s fertility intentions for 
second children. 
H3b: Support from grandparents has a positive effect on women’s giving birth to second 
children. 
  
DATA AND METHODS 
Sample  
Among a total of 7,031 females responded to all three waves of the survey, I first excluded 3,611 
women aged 41 or above in 2007. I then further limited my sample to married women, excluding 
629 women who had never married and 78 separated, divorced, or widowed women. Then I 
excluded 1,938 women who had two or more children in Wave 1, 177 women who did not 
indicate the number of children they had given birth to, and 7 women who did not respond to the 
question about fertility intentions. My sample-selection process resulted in 591 married women 
                                                             
13 Exceptions include Balbo and Mills (2011), which includes partners’ support, and Thomése and Liefbroer (2013), 
which controls for the use of formal childcare. 
48 
 
with one child. Finally, I excluded 66 cases because of missing values for husbands’ income 
(n=58), for elderly care because of old age or illness (n=6), and the hours that husbands spent on 
housework and childcare (n=2). The final analytic sample therefore includes 526 women with 
valid responses for all model covariates. I adjusted model estimations for individual weights in 
an attempt to reduce the potential issues of sample selection. 
 
Dependent variables: Fertility intentions and fertility behavior 
My dependent variables are fertility intentions for second children in 2007 and actual births in 
the following three years. I measured fertility intentions based on women’s responses to a 
question in Wave 1 that asked if respondents planned to have another child in the future, with 
three possible options, yes, no, and don’t know. I classified the responses into dichotomous 
categories. Responses of yes are coded 1 and responses of no or don’t know are coded 0. About 
half of my sample (52.8%) expressed their intention to have a second child as presented in Table 
2. The total expected number of children (including their current child) of these women is 1.35 
children.
14
 Fertility intentions serve as an independent variable for estimating fertility behavior. I 
used the responses to a question collected in Wave 2 or Wave 3 that asked, “Have you given 
birth to a child since the last interview?” to determine if a mother had a second child between 
2007 and 2010.
15
  The fertility behavior is also a dichotomous variable that differentiates had a 
second child (1) from did not have a second child (0).  
 
Independent variables: Supportive environments for family 
                                                             
14 The exact survey wording is as follows: “Considering your current life and future plan, how many children do you 
plan to have in total?” 
15 The interval between Wave 1 and Wave 2 was 12 months; the interval between Wave 2 and Wave 3 was 24 
months. 
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Supportive environments for family are classified into three aspects based on responses from 
Wave 1: supports from institutions, husbands, or grandparents. Demographers have used 
information on knowledge and attitudes to suggest implications for population policy (e.g., 
Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices of Contraception studies). The assumption of using this 
approach was that improving knowledge about and access to family planning (contraceptive 
methods) can help women prevent unwanted pregnancies (Westoff 1988). I adopt this approach 
to examine whether or not knowledge about pro-natal family policy programs positively 
influences fertility intentions or fertility behavior (H1a and H1b). I hypothesize that women with 
more knowledge of family policy are more likely to have positive fertility intentions and have 
second children compared with women with little or no knowledge about this policy. I measured 
support from the institutions using respondents’ knowledge about childcare leave reserved for 
use by fathers.
16
  I used responses to a question that asked “Have you ever heard about childcare 
policy such as childcare leave for use by fathers?” Responses ranged from never heard of it and 
heard of it but don’t know it well to heard of it and know it very well. I used never heard of it as a 
reference category. 
Support from the husband is based on women’s responses about their husbands’ 
participation in housework and childcare hours per day. Overall, the amount of time men devote 
to household tasks is quite low (mean = 1.18 hours, s.d. = .08).
17
  I coded support from husbands 
(i.e., wives’ reports of husbands’ time spent doing housework and childcare per day) into 
quartiles to test the fertility impact of support from the husbands (H2a and H2b). I used the 
                                                             
16 I chose the childcare availability for fathers instead of that of mothers since the M-shaped FLEP in Korea. Less 
than 30% of my sample was employed by the time of their initial interview in Wave 1. It is possible that a 
substantial proportion of women had already dropped out of the labor force after being married. 
17 For my sample, the average time spent on household labor by husbands was 1.18 hours. Thus, relative sharing of 
hours spent on housework and childcare between couples does not provide enough variation to test its effect on 
fertility. 
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lowest quartile
18
 (< 25%) of support from the husbands as the reference category. By utilizing 
quartiles, I can capture the threshold effects of husbands’ time devoted to housework and 
childcare. 
I constructed a categorical measure of support from grandparents
19
 that combines 
childcare support from parents or in-laws and multigenerational co-residence. The components 
are based on two questions that ask about childcare support from grandparents: “Does your 
father or mother look after your child for an hour or longer per week?” and “Does your father-in-
law or mother-in-law look after your child for an hour or longer per week?” I also used two 
questions that asked about the co-residence with parents or in-laws: “Does your father or mother 
live with you or your sibling” and “Does your father-in-law or mother-in-law live with you or 
your husband’s sibling?” First, I dichotomized the response by classifying whether or not 
respondents’ parents or in-laws live with the respondent. I then constructed a categorical variable 
by combining the childcare availability and co-residence with parents or in-laws: co-residence 
with grandparents providing childcare, co-residence with grandparents not providing childcare, 
no co-residence with grandparents providing childcare, and no co-residence with grandparents 
not providing childcare. 
 
Control Variables 
Guided by the literature, I included several demographic and socioeconomic variables, including 
respondents’ age, education, and employment, husbands’ income, and time since first birth. I 
used respondents aged less than 30 at Wave 1 as the reference category, and compared them with 
                                                             
18 The quartiles of a ranked set of data are the four subsets (equal groups) whose boundaries are the three quartile 
points. Each group includes approximately a quarter of data. For instance, the first quartile group includes the lowest 
25% of the data.  
19 Grandparents include both paternal and maternal grandparents. 
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women aged between 30 and 34, and women aged 35 or older. Slightly more than one third of 
respondents were less than 30 years old at Wave 1, another slightly more than one third of the 
respondents were between 30 and 34 years, and 28% were 35 or older. I compared highly 
educated women with college degrees with women who have a high-school diploma or less. I 
compared employed women with unemployed women. I compared women whose husbands’ 
monthly incomes fall in the highest quartile with those whose husbands’ incomes are the 
remaining three quartiles. A mean monthly husbands’ income for the highest quartile is 
4,731,000 Korean Won (approximately US$3,900). To control for place of residence, women 
who reside in urban areas (95%, reference category) were compared with respondents who reside 
in rural areas. To control for age-related capacities
20
 or illness of grandparents that may affect the 
availability of grandparental childcare support, I controlled for grandparents’ health status based 
on the following two questions: “Is your father or mother old or ill to the extent that he or she 
needs a caregiver?” and “Is your father-in-law or mother-in-law old or ill to the extent that he or 
she needs a caregiver?” Respondents could answer yes or no. I constructed a dichotomous 
variable to compare respondents with old or ill parents or in-laws with respondents who did not 
have old or ill parents or parents-in-law. 
 
  
                                                             
20 Grandparents’ labor force participation is also likely to influence the availability of grandparental childcare 
support. Due to the unavailability of this information, I could not control for this factor. In general, however, the 
labor force participation among elderly population is relatively low, especially among female. Labor force 
participation rates for women aged 60 or above stay approximately 30% since 2000.  
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of sample characteristics for married Korean women aged 40 or 
younger at Wave 1, KLoWF 2007 (N = 526) 
Variable Percentage Mean S.D. 
Had a birth (Wave 2 ~ Wave 3) 40.7   
Wave 1 (2007)    
Fertility intentions (yes) 52.8   
Age 
   
Less than 30 36.46   
30-34 36.24   
35-40 27.30   
Employment (employed) 25.61   
Education (college degree or above) 34.15   
Mean husband’s monthly income quartiles1)    
Lowest quartile 24.10 147.19 2.69 
2nd quartile 21.86 201.49 0.50 
3rd quartile 31.78 272.15 2.36 
Highest quartile 22.25 473.10 17.98 
Rural residence 5.60   
Caregiving needs for parents or in-laws due to old age or illness 
(yes) 
5.67   
Support from institutions (childcare leave for use by fathers) 
   
Never heard of it 17.70   
Heard of it, but don’t know it well 53.29   
Heard of it, and know it well 29.00   
Support from husband for housework and childcare (quartiles 
based on participation hours per day) 
   
Lowest quartile 26.98 0.04 0.01 
2nd quartile 33.49 0.48 0.01 
3rd quartile 14.53 1.05 0.02 
Highest quartile 25.00 3.42 0.19 
Support from parents or in-laws (childcare assistance)    
No coresidence with parents or in-laws not providing childcare 73.48   
No coresidence with parents or in-laws providing childcare 15.62   
Coresidence with parents or in-laws not providing childcare 2.91   
Coresidence with parents or in-laws providing childcare 7.99 
  
Note: 1) Unit for mean and standard deviation: 10,000 Korean won (approximately equal to US$8.50)  
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Methodological approach 
I used binary logistic regression models in order to test all hypotheses regarding my two 
dichotomous dependent variables: fertility intentions for second children at Wave 1 and a birth of 
a second child occurring between Wave 1 and Wave 3, during the period of three years. For each 
of the variables concerning supportive environments for family, I created dummy variables based 
on responses collected from Wave 1. For my analysis of actual fertility, I took into account the 
influence of fertility intentions at the initial interview, since fertility intention is likely to be a 
predictor of an actual childbirth.  
 
RESULTS 
Supportive environments for family and fertility intentions 
Table 3 presents logistic regression results for a series of nested models examining the 
relationship between supportive environments for family and fertility intentions among married 
women with one child. Model 1 incorporates control variables. Model 2 explores the importance 
of adding variables measuring family supportive environments. 
Model 1 presents a clear and strong impact of age-related demographic factors, in line 
with the expected directions based on the previous literature. The effects of these variables stay 
significant across models. Women aged 35 or older are less likely to intend to have second 
children than women aged less than 30. Time since first birth also has a strong effect on 
women’s fertility intentions. Women who gave birth to their first children more than five years 
earlier are significantly less likely to intend to have second children, compared to women who 
gave birth to their first children two or less years earlier. These women may be more likely to 
remain at parity 1 given the national short birth spacing intervals between first and second births. 
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Other socioeconomic control factors, including employment, education, husbands’ monthly 
income, and having old or ill parents or in-laws, have no significant impact on women’s fertility 
intentions for a second child. 
In Model 2, I tested the implications of adding variables indicating that three sources of 
supportive environments for family positively influence women’s fertility intentions for second 
children. Overall, results indicate that support from institutions, husbands, or grandparents has no 
significant impact on women’s fertility intentions. Women more knowledgeable and familiar 
with childcare policy reserved for exclusive use by fathers are more likely to have fertility 
intentions for second children, although the result is not statistically significant. Likewise, 
women whose husbands spend more time on housework and childcare are more likely to intend 
to have second children than women whose husbands spend the least amount of time on 
housework and childcare. However, this relationship is not significant. Support from 
grandparents, based on coresidence with parents or in-laws and the availability of childcare 
support from them, also has no significant impact on the likelihood of fertility intentions for 
second children. Women who do not live with parents or in-laws who provide childcare support 
are only slightly more likely to intend to have second children than women who do not live with 
parents or in-laws who do not provide childcare support, and this finding is not statistically 
significant. These findings do not support my hypotheses regarding the positive impact of 
supportive environments for family on fertility intentions. These findings do not support my 
hypotheses concerning the positive impact of supportive environments for family on fertility 
intentions for second children (H1a, H2a, and H3a). 
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Table 3 Logistic regression predicting patterns of fertility intentions for married Korean women 
aged 40 or younger with parity 1 at Wave 1, KLoWF 2007-2010 (N = 526) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable Coef. S.E. 
Odds 
ratio Coef. S.E. 
Odds 
ratio 
Age        
Less than 30 - - 1.00 - - 1.00 
30-34 -.21 .27 .81 -.23 .28 .80 
35-40 -1.11 .35 .33** -1.04 .35 .35** 
Employment (employed) -.08 .29 .93 -.21 .30 .81 
Education (college degree or above) .12 .26 1.13 .06 .26 1.06 
Highest quartile of the husband’s monthly 
income 
.03 .29 1.04 .05 .30 1.05 
Time since first birth        
Less than two years - - 1.00 - - 1.00 
Two years to five years -.23 .25 .80 -.28 .25 .76 
More than five years -1.44 .37 .24*** -1.45 .38 .23*** 
Caregiving needs for parents or in-laws 
due to old age or illness (yes)  
-.53 .43 .59 -.48 .42 .62 
Childcare leave for use by fathers       
Never heard of it    - - 1.00 
Heard of it, but don’t know it well    .36 .29 1.43 
Heard of it, and know it well    .27 .33 1.31 
Support from husband for housework and 
childcare  
      
Lowest quartile    - - 1.00 
2nd quartile    .36 .29 1.43 
3rd quartile    .26 .35 1.30 
Highest quartile    .18 .34 1.33 
Support from grandparents        
No co-residence with parents or in-laws 
not providing childcare  
   - - 1.00 
No co-residence with parents or in-laws 
providing childcare 
   .29 .38 1.33 
Co-residence with parents or in-laws not 
providing childcare 
   .13 .60 1.14 
Co-residence with parents or in-laws 
providing childcare 
   -.60 .42 .55 
Constant .85*** .25  .43 .38  
McFadden’s Adjusted R2 0.126 0.138 
Wald test for improvement of model fit  - 2.09 
Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. S.E. denotes standard error. 
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Supportive environments for family and fertility behavior 
Table 4 indicates the logistic regression results for a series of nested models of fertility behavior. 
I estimated fertility behavior models following the same procedure for the fertility intentions 
model. Model 1 shows that control variables generally have significant influences on women’s 
second births. As with the fertility intentions model, women aged between 30 and 34 and those 
aged 35 or above are significantly less likely to have second children than women aged less than 
30. Highly educated women are less likely to have second children than less educated women (p 
< .10). Employed women are less likely to have second children than unemployed women, when 
controlling for other variables (see Model 2). Women who gave birth to their first children 
between two and five years ago are more likely to have second children than women whose time 
since first birth is less than two years (p < .10). In addition, women with old or ill parents or in-
laws are less likely to have second births, net of other factors. As expected, fertility intentions at 
Wave 1 are a very strong predictor of actual fertility in the following three years. Women who 
intended to have second children at Wave 1 were six times more likely to have second children 
by Wave 3. 
Results from Model 2 indicate that supportive environments for family have stronger 
effects on women’s actual fertility. All sources of supportive environments for family 
significantly affect actual fertility, net of other factors, including fertility intentions. Women who 
have heard of childcare policy reserved for exclusive use by fathers and know it very well are 
twice as likely to give birth to second children as women who have never heard of it (p < .10). 
Women who have heard of childcare policy for fathers but do not know it well are slightly more 
likely to have second children than women who have never heard of it, but this finding is not 
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significant. These findings partly support my hypothesis (H1b) concerning the positive impact of 
support from institutions on fertility behavior, but the impact is relatively small. 
In contrast to the fertility intentions model, support from husbands regarding housework 
and childcare affects women’s second births. Women whose husbands spend the highest amount 
of time on housework and childcare are three times more likely to have second children than 
women whose husbands spend the least amount of time on housework and childcare. Women 
whose husbands’ spent hours on housework and childcare are in either the 2nd or the 3rd 
quartiles are only slightly more likely to have second children than women whose husbands’ 
spent hours on housework and childcare are in the lowest quartile. But this relationship does not 
reach statistical significance. 
Results suggest that support from grandparents significantly affects the likelihood of 
second births. Compared to women who do not live with parents or in-laws not providing 
childcare support, women who do not live with parents or in-laws providing childcare support 
are 1.6 times more likely to have second children. But this effect is not significant. Women who 
live with parents or in-laws not providing childcare support are no less likely to have second 
children than women who do not live with parents or in-laws not providing childcare support. 
Conversely, women who live with parents or in-laws providing childcare support are 2.5 times 
more likely to have second children than women do not live with parents or in-laws not 
providing childcare support. This offers support for H3b, which predicted a positive effect of 
grandparental childcare on childbirths (H3b). 
Adding supportive environments for family variables to the control model for predicting 
the likelihood of second births significantly improves the model fit (Wald test chi-square = 5.45, 
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df = 1, p < .02). This suggests that supportive environments for family are significant predictors 
of the likelihood of second births.  
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Table 4 Logistic regression predicting patterns of fertility behavior for married Korean women 
aged 40 or younger with parity 1 at Wave 1, KLoWF 2007-2010 (N = 526) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable Coef. S.E. 
Odds 
ratio Coef. S.E. 
Odds 
ratio 
Age       
Less than 30 - - 1.00 - - 1.00 
30-34 -.59 .29 .55* -.70 .30 .50* 
35-40 -1.36 .40 .26*** -1.42 .40 .24*** 
Employment (employed) -.34 .32 .71 -.64 .32 .53* 
Education (college degree or above) -.54 .29 .58
+
 -.72 .29 .49* 
Highest quartile of the husband’s monthly 
income  
.41 .34 1.50 .32 .35 1.38 
Time since first birth        
Less than two years - - 1.00 - - 1.00 
Two years to five years .52 .29 1.68
+
 .70 .29 2.01* 
More than five years -.70 .42 .50
+
 -.23 .44 .79 
Caregiving needs for parents or in-laws 
due to old age or illness (yes) 
-1.17 .53 .31* -1.34 .57 .26* 
Fertility intentions in 2007 1.78 .29 5.94*** 1.88 .29 6.55*** 
Childcare leave for use by fathers       
Never heard of it    - - 1.00 
Heard of it, but don’t know it well    .16 .38 1.17 
Heard of it, and know it well    .80 .43 2.22
+
 
Support from husband for housework and 
childcare  
      
Lowest quartile    - - 1.00 
2nd quartile    .55 .37 1.73 
3rd quartile    .24 .45 1.27 
Highest quartile    1.10 .38 3.02** 
Support from grandparents        
No co-residence with parents or in-laws 
not providing childcare 
   - - 1.00 
No co-residence with parents or in-laws 
providing childcare 
   .50 .38 1.64 
Co-residence with parents or in-laws not 
providing childcare 
   -.14 .86 .87 
Co-residence with parents or in-laws 
providing childcare 
   .92 .40 2.52* 
Constant   .47* -1.74 .52 .18*** 
McFadden’s Adjusted R2 0.241 0.277 
Wald test for improvement of model fit - 5.45* 
Note: + < .10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. S.E. denotes standard error. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, I examined whether supportive environments for family from three distinctive 
sources influence women’s fertility intentions and actual fertility for second children. Drawing 
on theories concerning support of families for enabling the work and family balance, I tested the 
impact of three sources of supportive environments, from institutions, husbands, and 
grandparents on fertility intentions and fertility behavior. 
My findings suggest that supportive environments for the family have more effect on 
fertility behavior than on fertility intentions. Supportive environments for family increase the 
likelihood of having second children, controlling for socio-demographic factors and fertility 
intentions. Support from the institutions, indirectly measured by the knowledge about childcare 
policy reserved for exclusive use by fathers, indicates a significant impact on the likelihood of 
having a second child. Women who are very familiar with childcare policy for use by fathers are 
more likely to have second children than women who do not know about it at all. This finding is 
in line with the conclusions drawn from Gauthier (2007), suggesting that family policy has a 
small, positive impact on fertility. Yet, for Koreans, this small, positive impact may be 
challenging to acquire given the institutional and cultural contexts. Although Korea currently 
provides the longest period of paid leave for exclusive use by fathers among OECD countries, 
this does not mean its substantive use by parents, or even public awareness of the policy itself. 
As my descriptive findings indicate, nearly half of the respondents are not very familiar with 
childcare policy for use by fathers, and 20% of them do not know about it at all. These multiple 
contingencies of receiving institutional support may be associated with the failure of the welfare 
state (Esping-Andersen 2009). 
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In a country with limited ability to provide high-quality institutional support for families, 
can support from husbands or grandparental childcare assistance increase the likelihood of 
second births? My results show positive effects of support from husbands and grandparents on 
the likelihood of second births. Women whose husbands’ spent hours on housework and 
childcare are in the highest quartile are more likely to have second children than women whose 
husbands’ spent hours on housework and childcare are in the lowest quartile. Moreover, it is 
worth noting that husbands’ spent hours on housework and childcare matter only when they 
reach or exceed three hours per day. This suggests that a greater involvement of men in family 
care is an important source of supportive environments for family, contributing to increasing 
fertility (Goldscheider et al. 2015). 
My results also support the positive effect of support from grandparental childcare 
assistance on having second children. Women who live with parents or in-laws providing 
childcare support are more likely to have second children than women who do not live with 
parents or in-laws not providing childcare support. This finding is consistent with previous 
studies, pointing to the importance of grandparental childcare assistance indicated by the 
geographical proximity and the availability of grandparental childcare on subsequent childbirths 
in Europe (e.g., Bühler and Philipov 2005; Hank and Kreyenfeld 2003; Rijken and Liefbroer 
2009; Thomese and Liefbroer 2013). Given the Korean context, marked by the limited support of 
families by the state as well as low male involvement in family care, grandparental childcare 
assistance is a significant source of support for family. 
These findings also contribute to our theoretical understanding of the interplay between 
the welfare state and the family in studies of fertility. Family sociologists emphasize the 
increasing importance of grandparents in contemporary families as families have longer “shared 
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lives” (e.g., Bengtson 2001) due to increased longevity. As my findings suggest, grandparents 
provide childcare support in times of need for their children. If grandparental childcare assistance 
is an important supplementary source of support in countries with a greater state support to 
families (Thomese and Liefbroer 2013), grandparental support may play a substantial role in 
countries like Korea, where state support is “limited and highly fragmented” support for the 
compatibility between work and family (Thévenon 2011:77). This fragmented support can also 
reduce the access to the available state support. 
It is important that support from husbands or grandparents does not supplement support 
from institutions (i.e., parental leave policies or public childcare) in that context. Low public 
knowledge about family policies, low generalized trust toward the state, and the availability of 
public support for a limited time concerning a few life transitions throughout the life course may 
all contribute to a weak welfare state with persistent incompatibility between work and family. In 
this context, mothers’ employment opportunities are often restricted, so they tend to be full-time 
mothers. If mothers are employed, they must rely on support from extended family, usually 
grandmothers, on a regular basis (Hank and Buber 2009). This interaction between three sources 
of support for family raises concerns about the possible consequences of the low gender equity 
trap, which keeps increasing the family’s responsibilities. Korean families need to take care of 
their own members throughout the life course, instead of relying on ad-hoc public support. As 
long as the Korean family experiences increasing challenges to balance work and family, mostly 
relying on sources of support from their family of origin, the aggregate level of fertility in Korea 
will remain low, although some individuals have higher fertility because of the availability of 
these types of support. This may require an effort to integrate market employment to enhance 
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gender egalitarian relationships and policies (Kaufman and Bernhardt 2012) and to increase male 
involvement in the family (Goldscheider et al. 2015). 
Interestingly, my findings suggest a puzzling picture of the role of supportive 
environments for family in fertility intentions and behavior. Supportive environments for family 
from three sources indicate stronger positive effects on actual fertility than fertility intentions for 
second children. This evidence is contradictory to previous findings that the determinants of 
intended fertility and actual fertility are relatively consistent based on 20 European countries 
(Harknett, Billari, and Medalia 2014) and the United States (Rindfuss et al. 1988). Although 
fertility intention itself is a strong predictor of actual fertility, my findings also suggest an 
inconsistency between fertility intentions and behavior (Harknett and Hartnett 2014; Morgan and 
Rackin 2010). In the context of strong societal norms about two-child family ideals and the 
notion of traditional marriage relationships, planning to have second children may be normative. 
This may explain why only factors relating to women’s biological clocks matter. In contrast, 
having second children is more contingent upon the availability of resources that families can 
utilize, which can either provide opportunities or constraints. Thus, even with the desire for 
second children, it can be challenging for women to have second children without tangible 
support from institutions, husbands, parents, or in-laws. 
This inconsistency between fertility intentions and fertility behavior leads me to ask 
further questions. What proportion of women actually realizes their intended fertility for a 
second child? In the next chapter, I answer this question by paying special attention to the role of 
gender equity in the family, in order to expand our understanding of what it means to gender 
equity in the family reflecting unique cultural legacy of patriarchal family gender relations and 
high educational aspirations.  
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CHAPTER 3  
GENDER EQUITY AND THE REALIZATION OF FERTILITY INTENTIONS
21
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As I discussed in Chapter 1, South Korea has experienced drastic decline in TFR from 3.43 in 
1975 to 1.19 in 2014 (Statistics Korea 2014). However, two-child family ideals persist among 
South Korean men and women.
22
 Within the growing research on low fertility, Peter McDonald 
(2000a; 2000b) argues that within a given society the national emergence of low fertility stems 
from continued gender inequity. His approach focuses upon gender equity at the institutional 
level, such as labor markets, benefits from a welfare state, and most importantly within the 
family.  
Gender equity theory provides insights into how gender inequity in institutions such as 
the family lowers individual fertility due to the role incompatibility between parenting and 
working in the labor force (Balbo, Billari, and Mills 2013; Torr and Short 2004). Examinations 
of gender equity are based primarily on evidence from European and North American cases, 
characterized by long-term low fertility rates and high female labor force participation (e.g., 
Mills, Mencarini, Tanturri, and Begall 2008; Torr and Short 2004). There is, as yet, relatively 
little evidence about the linkage between gender equity and fertility in non-Western low fertility 
contexts. The recent and rapid declines in fertility across East Asia may provide unique avenues 
for the examination of variation within a national setting. High levels of parental investment in 
children’s education, also referred to as “education fever”, are cited as an explanation for the 
                                                             
21 An article version of this chapter appears in Asian Population Studies. Yoon, Soo-Yeon. 2016. “Is Gender 
Inequality a Barrier to Realizing Fertility Intentions? Fertility Aspirations and Realizations in South Korea.” Asian 
Population Studies 12(2): 203-219. DOI:10.1080/17441730.2016.1163873 
22 According to the 2010 Korean National Survey on Family, the majority of South Korean men and women (61%) 
view a two-child family as ideal and another 20% identify three children as ideal. 
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extremely low fertility in South Korea (hereafter Korea), and East Asia more broadly (Anderson 
and Kohler 2013).  
In this chapter, I investigate whether perceptions of gender equity within the family 
influence the realization of fertility desires within the context of institutional gender inequality. 
Do indications of higher gender equity in the family always have a positive impact on the 
realization of fertility intentions in low fertility countries? Is this true even within countries 
experiencing a relatively recent transition to low fertility and low gender equity regimes? Korea 
provides an interesting case of a rapid fertility decline, lowest-low fertility, low gender equity, 
weak institutional supports for child rearing, and, concurrently, a strong normative focus 
idealizing the two-child family. I aim to contribute to the literature on the link between gender 
equity and low fertility by confirming the importance of household labor sharing in a new 
context and incorporating a stronger focus on issues concerning parental educational 
responsibilities. Moreover, I explore how the relationship between gender equity within the 
family and individual fertility may work differently in concert with the unique gender equity 
contexts in Korea. To reflect a unique cultural emphasis on education, I expand gender equity 
theory to incorporate patterns of decision-making about children’s education.  
 
PREVIOUS FINDINGS & HYPOTHESES 
Previous findings linking gender equity and fertility  
Building upon McDonald’s theory of gender equity and fertility, empirical studies have 
examined the implications for individual experiences by investigating the impact of gender 
equity in the family, usually as indicated by the division of household labor between couples 
(e.g., Cooke 2009; Mills et al. 2008; Olàh 2003; Torr and Short 2004) or gender role attitudes 
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within the family (e.g., Goldscheider et al. 2013), on fertility. Previous studies concerning the 
link between gender role attitudes and fertility suggest mixed findings depending on which 
aspect of gender role attitudes were examined, either women’s role in the public sphere of work 
or men’s role in the private sphere of the family (e.g., Miettinen et al. 2011; Philipov 2008; 
Westoff and Higgins 2009). Moreover, women holding egalitarian gender role attitudes may 
receive more support for housework and childcare from their husbands, which, in turn, may 
increase the realization of their desired fertility. As the theoretical idea linking gender equity and 
fertility has implications on the equitable division of household labor, men’s familial roles 
should have a positive effect on fertility. This led me to formulate my first hypothesis concerning 
the positive impact of egalitarian gender role attitudes toward male role in the home on fertility, 
more specifically the realization of fertility intentions.  
H1. Women who hold egalitarian gender role attitudes tend to be more likely to realize 
their fertility intentions than women holding traditional gender role attitudes. 
 
  Findings from several studies support a positive link between gender equity in the family, 
reflected in contributions to housework and childcare, and fertility intentions (Mills et al. 2008; 
Neyer, Lappegård, and Vignoli 2013; Olàh 2003; Tazi-Preve, Bichlbauer, and Goujon 2004) and 
fertility outcomes (Cooke 2009; Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Branden 2013; Torr and Short 
2004). Across existing research, male contributions to housework and childcare play a key role 
in shaping fertility intentions and outcomes, particularly in long standing low fertility and low 
gender equity countries, such as Italy (Miettinen et al. 2011) and Hungary (Olàh 2003). Will 
men’s participation in housework and childcare positively affect fertility realization in Korea, as 
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found in Europe? Building upon the previous findings, I formulate a hypothesis concerning the 
impact of men’s participation in housework and childcare on the realization of fertility intentions.   
H2. Women whose husbands spend a high number of hours (>75%; more than 2 
hours/day) on housework and childcare tend to be more likely to realize fertility 
intentions than women whose husbands do not. 
 
If men’s participation in housework and childcare has a positive effect on fertility, conversely, 
women’s heavy responsibility of housework and childcare may negatively affect fertility. 
Women’s primary responsibility for housework and childcare may discourage women to realize 
their desired second child, although they had positive fertility intentions at Wave 1. This led me 
to construct my third hypothesis concerning women’s responsibility for housework and childcare 
on the realization of fertility intentions for a second child.  
H3. Women who spend a high number of hours (>75%; more than 10 hours/day) on 
housework and childcare tend to be less likely to realize intentions than women who 
spend less time on housework and childcare. 
 
Household decision-making patterns and fertility  
Women’s involvement in household decision-making is a key element of gender equity in 
the family, reflecting women’s voice and agency within the household (Folbre 1983; Morris 
1990). Women’s participation in household decision-making is most often studied in high-
fertility settings, where findings indicate that women with high levels of household decision-
making power are best able to control their fertility and limit family size (e.g., Morgan and 
Niraula 1995; Upadhyay and Karasek 2012). These studies, often based on rural settings, 
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examine women’s decision-making concerning children’s education, elder care, household 
spending and consumption.  
In a context strongly emphasizing children’s education as a means of upward social 
mobility and economic prosperity, does women’s responsibility for their children’s education 
represent female agency, or might this responsibility be an extra burden to housework and 
childcare? In Korea, education is one of the top priority tasks of family decision-making since 
education is viewed as a best means of upward social mobility and economic prosperity (Park, 
Byun, and Kim 2011). Korean education requires high parental involvement and investment, 
including academic extra-curricular activities, private tutors and careful monitoring of their 
children’s academic success (Park et al. 2011).  
Responsibility for the educational decisions concerning the first child is likely to be an 
important driver of extremely low fertility in Korea, where educational aspirations are great and 
state support is low. Responsibility in this sphere may reflect more of an obligation than an 
indicator of autonomy. Korea’s cultural focus on raising successful children with extremely high 
parental involvement and investment can extend our understanding of household decision-
making regarding child’s education, contributing to the broader theoretical questions about how 
responsibility patterns reflect gender equity in the family and further relate to fertility. Studies on 
the link between gender equity and low fertility often exclude household decision-making as an 
indicator of gender equity. When institutional settings and traditional gender role expectations 
challenge balancing work and family, the fertility effect of educational responsibilities for 
children may interact with women’s domestic responsibilities for housework and childcare.   
H4. The fertility impact of patterns of parental educational responsibility differs by 
women’s burden of housework and childcare: 1) Women-dominated educational 
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responsibility positively relates to the realization of fertility intentions, among women 
with relatively light housework and childcare burdens. 2) Joint educational responsibility 
with husbands positively relates to the realization of fertility intentions if women bear 
relatively higher housework and childcare burdens. 
 
METHODS 
Sample 
A total of 7,031 respondents participated in all three waves of the study currently available. 
Questions concerning fertility intentions are limited to currently married women, younger than 
45, with at least one birth experience. Within this group, I further restrict my analyses to married 
mothers of parity 1, under the age of 40 and expressing positive fertility intentions at Wave 1. I 
then trace fertility-related responses for this sub-sample across Wave 2 and Wave 3 with all valid 
responses for multivariate models (N=235).
23
  
The longitudinal nature of these data allows me to examine individual changes associated 
with key life transitions (i.e., transitions to a second birth) over the course of a three-year period. 
Three years are not enough to fully examine the realization of all desired second births, but it 
provides a sufficient number of years given the short intervals between first and second births.  
 
Measures 
- Dependent variable: realization of fertility intentions 
I combine responses concerning married women’s fertility intentions and their actual 
childbearing experiences across Waves 1 and 3 of the survey to identify those who have realized 
                                                             
23  There were a total of 545 married mothers of parity 1, under the age of 40 at Wave 1. Of those, 304 women 
expressed positive intentions for a second child at Wave 1. 
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their fertility intentions and those who have not. Fertility intentions are measured at Wave 1, 
when respondents were asked if they planned to have another child in the future, with three 
possible options, including ‘yes’, ‘no’, and ‘don’t know’. I select only those reporting ‘yes’ for 
the construction of my dependent variable.
 24
 Among women with positive fertility intentions at 
Wave 1, births were noted at Wave 2 or 3. As presented in Table 1, nearly 40 percent of married 
women with one child and desiring a second at Wave 1 fail to have a second child by Wave 3. 
The issue of right censoring may lead to an underreporting of second births, but given the short 
birth intervals noted above, the effect should be relatively small.  
- Independent variables: Gender equity  
I examine the importance of four dimensions of gender equity within the family: gender 
role attitudes, husband’s hours spent on housework and childcare, wife’s hours on housework 
and childcare, and educational responsibility for the first child. These measures reflect answers at 
Wave 1, before the transition to a second child.  
To explore whether egalitarian attitudes toward men’s family support positively affects 
the realization of fertility intentions for a second child (H1), I assess gender role attitudes with 
the following statement: “Dual-earner couples should equally share household labor.” 
Respondents were asked to express their degree of agreement or disagreement on a four-point 
Likert scale (1 standing for a ‘strong agreement’ and 4 a ‘strong disagreement’). Due to few 
responses of ‘strong disagreement’, it was combined with ‘somewhat disagreement,’ resulting in 
                                                             
24 Of women who expressed no intended second birth (N=241), only 19 women reported a second birth by Wave 3. 
It is impossible to know if these reflect unplanned pregnancies, spousal desires for another child or other factors. My 
central question concerns identifying factors, with an emphasis of the role of gender equity in the family, relating to 
the realization of their intended birth, so I opted to focus on women who expressed fertility intentions for a second 
child. I excluded respondents who were pregnant at the time of interview at Wave 3 (N=25). Little attention has 
been paid to unintended fertility in Asian low fertility setting with an exception of Raymo et al.’s (2014) recent 
study examining educational differences in unintended first births in Japan. In most cases, however, studies on 
unintended fertility, including Raymo et al.’s (2014) examine retrospective fertility intentions as the dependent 
variable. This approach is different from the one that I wanted to test in this paper, given that I focus on the 
realization of prospective fertility intentions. 
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a three-category response of traditional, moderate egalitarian, and strong egalitarian attitudes. 
Traditional attitudes are selected to serve as the reference category.  
Husband’s participation in housework and childcare is reported (in hours and minutes) by 
their wives. Generally, the amount of time men devote to household tasks is quite low
25
. I code 
wives’ reports of husbands’ time spent doing housework and childcare per day (mean=1.39 hours, 
s.d=.14) into quartiles to test the fertility impact of men’s contribution to the family (H2). I use 
the lowest quartile (<25%), of men contributing to housework and childcare, as the reference 
category. By utilizing quartiles, I can capture the threshold effects of husbands’ time devoted to 
housework and childcare.  
The self-reported number of housework and childcare hours per day is substantially 
higher for the women in my sample in comparison to men (mean=7.18 hours, s.d=.40). To 
enhance comparability, I also divide these reported figures into quartiles, and use the lowest 
quartile (<25%) as the reference category. This variable enables me to test the negative impact of 
women’s spent hours on housework and childcare in determining the realization of an intended 
second birth. 
Finally, I measure patterns of educational responsibility using responses to the question 
about decision-making patterns regarding child’s education. I use the following question: “When 
your family makes a decision on children’s education, whose opinion is mostly reflected in the 
decision?” Responses in the following four categories: “mostly my opinion,” “mostly the 
husband’s opinion,” “the couple’s opinion,” or “together with other family members’ opinion” 
are recorded. I excluded the response of “together with other family members” (N=5) and 
                                                             
25 For my analytic sample, the average hours of household labor fulfilled by their husbands were 1.39 hours. Thus, 
relative sharing of spent hours on housework and childcare between couples does not provide enough variations to 
test its effect. United Nation assessments in 2003 also revealed that South Korean women spent 4.6 times more 
hours on unpaid work, housework and childcare than men. This is far higher than rates experienced, for example, by 
Dutch women (2.4) or Australian women (1.8).    
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“mostly the husband’s opinion” (N=7) due to its very small cell sizes. The remaining responses 
are divided between those reporting that the decision is mostly up to the wife and those reporting 
the decision is mostly the couple’s joint decision. In addition to using the direct effects to test 
educational responsibility patterns on the likelihood of a second birth, I add an interaction term 
of educational responsibility patterns and women’s spent hours on housework and childcare. This 
allows me to test H4, predicting that women primarily responsible for child’s educational 
decisions are more likely to have a second child, if their responsibilities for housework and 
childcare are not overly heavy.  
- Other control variables 
Guided by previous literatures, I include five socio-demographic control variables; age, 
employment, education, sib-ship and marital duration. These are factors shown as significant 
predictors of fertility realization, and controlling for them will clarify the relationships between 
my four vectors of gender equity and the realization of fertility intentions for a second child. 
Married women aged less than 30 at Wave 1 (reference category) were compared with between 
30 and 34 and between 35 and 40. Employed women are compared with unemployed women. 
Employed women may be less likely to realize a second intended birth because of the expected 
conflict between work and family roles. Highly-educated women (i.e., holding a bachelor’s 
degree or higher) are compared with those with less education. Women whose husbands’ income 
falls in the highest quartile were compared with the rest of women whose husbands’ income is 
below 75%. I control for the number of respondents’ siblings, classify this variable into ‘having 
3 or less’ and ‘more than 3’.26 Lastly, I control for marital duration because women who have 
been married more than 5 years may be more likely to realize their intended second births, given 
                                                             
26 The average number of respondents’ siblings is 3.24.  
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the short birth intervals between first and second births in Korea. Descriptive statistics for all 
independent variables measured at Wave 1 included in the analysis are presented in Table 5.  
 
Analytic strategy  
To assess the impact of gender equity on the realization of fertility intentions, I employ binary 
logistic regression models in which examining the effect of my independent variables from 
Wave 1 upon the likelihood of a second birth.
27
 I report predicted probabilities in order to assess 
changes in the predicted probabilities of a second birth from Waves 2 and 3 in Table 6. 
Calculations are adjusted for the PSU, and individual weights are employed in the bivariate and 
multivariate analyses. 
 
  
                                                             
27 I tested issues of multicolinearity among independent variables and found no problem.  
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Table 5 Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables, married Korean women with 
one child, age 40 or younger at Wave 1, KLoWF 2007 (N=235) 
Variable Percent Mean 
Realization of fertility intentions   
   Yes 62.10  
   No 37.90  
Age    
Less than 30 45.23  
30-34 40.70  
35-40 14.07  
Employment (employed) 22.84  
Education (college degree or above) 34.20  
Mean husband’s monthly income quartiles*   
     Lowest quartile  127.42 
     2nd quartile  191.72 
     3rd quartile  266.71 
     Highest quartile  483.29 
Sibling size   
     3 or less  64.00  
     More than 3 36.00  
Marital duration   
     5 years or less  81.14  
     More than 5 years 18.86  
Gender role attitudes   
     Egalitarian 50.51  
     Intermediate 42.55  
     Traditional 6.94  
Mean husband’s housework and childcare hours per day quartiles   
     Lowest quartile  0 
     2nd quartile  0.5 
     3rd quartile  1.03 
     Highest quartile  3.48 
Mean wife’s housework and childcare hours per day quartiles   
     Lowest quartile  1.40 
     2nd quartile  2.71 
     3rd quartile  3.72 
     Highest quartile  10.34 
Patterns of decision-making about children’s education   
Mostly women’s decision 40.14  
Joint decision with husbands 59.86  
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FINDINGS 
The effect of gender equity on the realization of fertility intentions 
In keeping with my hypotheses pertaining to the effects of gender equity variables, 
weighted logistic regression models assess the importance of specific indicators of gender equity, 
while controlling for other variables (Table 6). Results indicate that, net of socio-demographic 
controls, several measures of gender equity have a significant impact on the relative odds of 
realizing fertility intentions for a second child. I employ Model 1 for testing H1, H2, and H3, and 
employ Model 2 for testing H4.  
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Table 6 Logistic regression predicting patterns of realization of fertility intentions for married 
Korean women, age 40 or younger with parity one at Wave 1, KLoWF 2007-2010 (N=235) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable Coef. S.E. 
Odds 
ratio Coef. S.E. 
Odds 
ratio 
Age (relative to less than 30)       
   30-34 .011 .394 1.011 -.053 .383 .948 
   35-40 -.841 .519 .431 -.934 .541 .393
+
 
Employment (employed) -.333 .426 .717 -.527 .432 .590 
Education (college degree +) -.211 .355 .810 -.108 .349 .898 
Husband's income (top 25%) .473 .444 1.605 .431 .461 1.539 
Sibling size (more than 3) -.103 .347 .902 -.124 .349 .884 
Marital duration (5 years or less) -.405 .460 .667 -.276 .489 .759 
Gender role attitudes  
(ref. traditional)       
    Moderately egalitarian 1.301 .652 3.690 * 1.253 .665 3.502 
+
 
    Strongly Egalitarian 1.683 .663 5.381 * 1.675 .675 5.337 * 
Husband’s housework hours per day  
(ref. lowest quartile)       
2
nd
 quartile .485 .451 1.624 .447 .444 1.564 
3
rd
 quartile -.006 .566 .994 -.057 .587 .944 
Highest quartile 1.042 .485 2.834 * 1.024 .499 2.784 * 
Wife's housework hours per day  
(ref. lowest quartile)       
    2
nd
 quartile -.838 .528 .433 -.677 .681 .508 
3
rd
 quartile -.301 .460 .739 .506 .540 1.659 
Highest quartile -.091 .519 .913 -.080 .656 .923 
Responsibility for children’s 
education  
(Mostly wife’s decision) -.194 .335 .824 1.214 .813 3.368 
Wife’s housework (2nd quartile) X 
Mostly Wife’s  decision    -1.091 1.142 .336 
Wife’s housework (3rd quartile) X 
Mostly Wife’s  decision    -2.515 .958 .081 ** 
Wife’s housework (highest quartile) 
X Mostly Wife’s  decision    -.852 1.040 .426 
Constant -.464 .869 .629   .481 
Note: + <.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. S.E. denotes standard error.  
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In H1, I predict that egalitarian gender role attitudes increase the likelihood of realizing 
fertility intentions. Results from Model 1 support this hypothesis. Women’s gender role attitudes 
play a significant role in the realization of fertility intentions for a second child. Among women 
at parity 1 who desire another child, women holding strong egalitarian gender role attitudes are 
5.4 times more likely to realize fertility intentions for a second child when compared to women 
holding traditional attitudes. Women holding moderate egalitarian gender role attitudes are 3.7 
times more likely to realize their intended second births than those holding traditional gender 
role attitudes, controlling for other aspects of gender equity and control variables.  
Figure 6 presents the influence of the gender role attitudes on the likelihood of realizing 
an intended second birth. I estimate the probability of the realization of fertility intentions for a 
second child based on the regression coefficients for gender role attitudes, holding all other 
model variables at their means. 70 percent of women holding strong egalitarian gender role 
attitudes and 61 percent of women holding moderate egalitarian gender role attitudes are 
expected to realize their intended second births. By contrast, only 30 percent of women holding 
traditional gender role attitudes are expected to realize their fertility intentions for a second child. 
Women holding traditional gender role attitudes may fail to realize their intentions for a second 
child due to high expectations for their role in the family as wives and mothers, both from 
themselves and other family members. Fulfilling expectations at home and in the economy may 
well mean that having a second child is ‘too much’ for these more traditional women.  
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Figure 6 Predicted probabilities for realizing fertility intentions for a second child by gender role 
 
 
I predict a positive impact of husbands’ participation in housework and childcare on the 
realization of women’s fertility intentions in H2. Results support my hypothesis, providing 
evidence the husbands’ participation in housework and childcare increases the likelihood of 
realizing fertility intentions for a second child.
28
 Women whose husbands spend the highest 
amount of time (i.e., on average, 3.5 hours per day) on housework and childcare are nearly 3 
times more likely to realize fertility intentions for a second child than women whose husbands 
are in the lowest quartile of reported housework and childcare (i.e., no participation). Women 
with husbands spending moderate hours on housework and childcare (the 2
nd
 or the 3
rd
 quartiles 
of this measure) are not more likely to realize their fertility intentions for a second child. These 
results support the contention that having a partner who is contributing to housework and 
                                                             
28 In some previous studies, the division of household labor between spouses has been measured using the 
percentage of time each spouse spends in housework and childcare tasks relative to the total amount of time spent on 
housework and childcare (e.g., Cooke 2009; Torr and Short 2004). I performed a further analysis using different 
measures for the division of housework and childcare in order to investigate whether the results would be similar to 
those presented in Table 6. The results show very consistent findings. All variables of gender equity in the family 
show consistent effects on the realization of fertility intentions. As the amount of time husbands spend in housework 
and childcare increases the likelihood of realizing fertility intentions, women whose husbands’ share of housework 
and childcare are in the highest quartile show a greater likelihood of realizing fertility intentions (results not shown).   
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childcare is an important factor in increasing Korean fertility outcomes, even when controlling 
for women’s own housework and childcare hours. This effect is only significant for women 
whose husbands are in the highest quartile of reported housework and childcare. This may 
represent the threshold effects of men’s participation in housework and childcare. Results 
suggest that this threshold effect lies at a point beyond the amount of time men typically spent on 
housework and childcare.
29
 Table 1 shows a radical change of men’s average spent hours on 
housework and childcare between the 3
rd
 quartile and the 4
th
 quartile. In the Korean context, 
where support from other avenues is nearly absent, findings suggest that to have a significant 
positive impact on the likelihood of realization of women’s fertility intentions for a second child, 
an average of 3.5 hours of housework and childcare per day by a husband is needed.  
Shifting the focus to women’s domestic responsibilities, in H3 I predict that higher levels 
of time spent on housework and childcare by women would lower the odds of realizing fertility 
intentions for a second child. Results, among women expressing a desire for a second child, 
provide no clear evidence to support this hypothesis. Compared to women who report spending 
the least amount of time on housework and childcare, women who spent more hours on 
housework and childcare appear less likely to realize their fertility intentions for a second child, 
but the relationship is not statistically significant.  
Lastly, I anticipate that the impact of patterns of decision-making about child’s education 
depends on women’s housework and childcare burden (H4). In Model 2, I add an interaction 
term between women’s daily hours of housework and childcare and patterns of household 
decision-making in the area of child’s education to test H4. The results for main effects (Model 1) 
indicate that mother’s primary responsibility for educational decision-making does not 
                                                             
29 Similarly, there is evidence of threshold effects of housework on wages for married women and men (e.g., Hersh 
2009).  
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significantly affect the likelihood of realizing fertility intentions for a second child, when 
compared to women who jointly decide their child’s education with their husbands. Results from 
Model 2 suggest that responsibility for child’s education impact the realization of fertility 
intentions for a second child, but the effect depends upon women’s housework and childcare 
burdens. Compared to women who jointly decide their child’s education with the husbands, 
women who are mainly responsible for their child's education and those in the 3
rd
 quartile of 
hours spent on housework and childcare are significantly less likely to realize their fertility 
intentions for a second child than those in the lowest quartile. Compared to women who jointly 
decide their child’s education, women who are mainly responsible for their child’s education and 
those in the 2
nd
 or the 4
th
 quartile of hours spent on housework and childcare are not less likely to 
realize their fertility intentions for a second child than those in the lowest quartile. The effects for 
the other two gender equity measures, gender role attitudes, and husbands’ housework and 
childcare hours, maintain significance for predicting the realization of fertility intentions as 
presented in Model 1. 
I plot the predicted probabilities in Figure 7. Among women who spend the least amount 
of time (on average, 1.4 hours per day) on housework and childcare, women who mostly decide 
child’s education indicate a higher predicted probability (0.84) to realize an intended second 
birth than those who jointly decide their child’s education (0.64). The predicted probabilities of 
realizing a second intended birth drop to approximately 0.50 for women in the second quartile of 
hours spent on housework and childcare (i.e. 2.7 hours per day). In contrast, for women who 
spend nearly 4 hours (3
rd
 quartile) per day doing housework and childcare, women who jointly 
decide their child’s education with their husbands show a higher predicted probability (0.73) to 
realize fertility intentions for a second child, compared to that of women who mostly decide their 
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child’s education (0.46). Lastly, among women whose housework and childcare hours are an 
average of 10 hours per day (highest quartile), women who jointly decide their child’s education 
with the husbands have a predicted probability of 0.69 while that of women who mostly decide 
their child’s education is 0.62.  
Findings suggest a non-linear effect of patterns of educational responsibility on the 
realization of fertility intentions for a second child, which depends on women’s spent hours on 
housework and childcare. Women who spend nearly 4 hours on housework and childcare per day 
(3
rd
 quartile) are more likely to work in the labor force, compared to women whose housework 
and childcare hours exceed 10 hours per day. This suggests that women who try to balance their 
roles in the labor force and family may feel “extra burden” or “second shift” (Hochschild 1989) 
due to their husbands’ limited participation in housework and childcare as well as educational 
responsibility for their child. Subsequently, these perceived challenges significantly lower the 
likelihood of realizing women’s intended second birth. This finding indicates that general 
domestic responsibilities leave out another aspect of the division of household labor: educational 
planning. In a context of strong female role expectations and high emphasis on educational 
attainment, being responsible for children’s education may not necessarily reflect women’s 
autonomy, but rather a unique increase in women’s domestic burden. ‘Second shift’ for Korean 
women may mean not only doing housework and childcare, also being responsible for their 
child’s education, ultimately raising a high quality child under the influence of ‘education fever’.   
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Figure 7 Predicted probabilities by women's housework and childcare hours and patterns of 
decision-making 
 
 
My findings fail to reflect the importance of the demographic and socioeconomic control 
variables suggested by the literature. Age, employment status, educational attainment, sib-ship, 
husbands’ income and marital duration have no significant impact on the realization of fertility 
intentions for a second child in the model with main effects (Model 1). Age does gain statistical 
significance in Model 2 indicating (unsurprisingly) that women aged 35 or above are less likely 
to realize their fertility intentions for a second child in comparison to women under 30 years of 
age (at .10). This result is reflective of the national trends in fertility in Korea, which decline 
markedly past 35 (Kye 2012).
30
 No significant impact of individual characteristics on the 
realization of fertility intentions may indicate that the current very low fertility in Korea is 
associated with period-related factors.  
                                                             
30 The age pattern of fertility in 2013 shows its peak fertility occurring in women in the age group 30-34 (111.4 per 
1,000 females) and the abrupt decline after 35. The respective age-specific fertility rates for women in the age group 
35-39 and 40-44 are 39.5 and 4.8 per 1,000 females with the TPFR of 1.19 (Statistics Korea 2013).  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION   
In hopes of confirming and expanding the links between gender equity and fertility, the 
goal of this chapter was to examine the realization of fertility intentions within a context of rapid 
fertility decline and institutional gender inequality. South Korea, marked by rapid and recent 
fertility decline and low gender equity, differs substantially from the European countries often 
used as case studies for gender equity (where long-term low fertility and a stronger tradition of 
female labor force participation are common). Results from Korea point to the importance of 
gender equity in the family for understanding individual variation in fertility within a low 
fertility country. By investigating four facets of gender equity, I seek to confirm and expand 
theories of gender equity and low fertility. I find that among women at parity one who report the 
desire for a second child, those who hold egalitarian gender role attitudes are more likely to 
realize their intended second births, compared to women with traditional gender role attitudes. 
Men’s time spent in housework and childcare increases the likelihood of realizing intended 
second births. Women’s daily hours for housework and childcare were alone not clearly 
important in Korean case. Patterns’ of educational responsibility play a unique and important 
role interacting with women’s housework and childcare burdens in realizing second births.  
The Korean case contributes to our understanding how indicators of gender equity within 
the family operate differently in a unique contextual background. Contexts characterized by a 
rapid fertility decline, lowest-low fertility, low gender equity regimes, and weak institutional 
support for childrearing confirm and challenge findings from European and North American 
cases. Linking to the notion of “incomplete gender revolution” in the private sphere regarding 
men’s roles (Goldscheider et al. 2015), the findings suggest that Korean women with traditional 
gender role attitudes may face high levels of role conflict, lowering the likelihood of realizing an 
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intended second birth as gender role attitudes lay the foundation in the shape of the sharing of 
household responsibilities. Hence, women holding traditional gender role attitudes may receive 
very little support for housework and childcare from their husbands. These women with 
traditional gender role attitudes may feel much higher pressure on their expected roles in the 
family, including raising a high-quality child, with no or little support from husbands and 
institutions.   
My findings reinforce the importance of men’s commitment to housework and childcare 
for realizing women’s intended second births, affirming recent findings on the positive 
relationship between men’s participation in housework and childcare and fertility in Europe 
(Cooke 2009; Olàh 2003). These results underscore the importance of male involvement in the 
family as a powerful pathway for increasing fertility within low fertility contexts.   
Integrating patterns of educational responsibility as a dimension of gender equity in the 
family also extend the gender equity literature. This topic has yet to receive much attention in 
Western-oriented low fertility theories. My findings indicate that the fertility impact of women’s 
educational responsibility for their child interact with women’s domestic responsibilities for 
housework and childcare. Women who are the primary decision makers regarding their child’s 
education and have heavy burdens on housework and childcare (the 3
rd
 quartile) face the lowest 
probability of realizing their intended second birth. These women may try to balance their roles 
between work and family rather than giving priority to either family or work. This finding 
challenges previous studies in high fertility settings, as it suggests that women’s main 
responsibility for their children’s education may not always represent autonomy. Instead, over-
reliance on mothers’ educational responsibility may indicate another taxing facet of domestic 
responsibilities, expanding our conventional understanding of the ‘second shift’ of housework 
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and childcare. This is particularly relevant in the context of low gender equity and high cultural 
importance placed on education, such as in Korea and perhaps East Asia, more generally 
(Anderson and Kohler 2013).  
 Building upon previous studies examining the realization of fertility intentions, I 
investigated factors that facilitate or inhibit the realization of fertility intentions for a second 
child. Contradictory to previous findings about the importance of demographic and 
socioeconomic variables, my findings reveal that individual characteristics have no significant 
impact on the realization of fertility intentions for a second child in this sample of Korean 
women. This may indicate that low fertility in Korea is associated with period effect (Kye 2012). 
This has implications on the interaction between the role of family and gender equity regimes for 
fertility outcomes, calling for improvement in gender equity in both public and private spheres.  
This study has a few limitations. Since my analytic sample is somewhat homogeneous 
(e.g., all currently married and positive intention for a second child), selection effects are a 
concern. Future research with a more heterogeneous sample in terms of partnership status may 
produce different results, as previous studies identify partnership status as an important 
determinant of fertility realization (e.g., Balbo and Mills 2011; Harknett and Hartnett 2014). My 
analytical sample may also be selected for higher gender equity as I limited it to those with 
positive fertility intentions for a second child. Unobserved factors affecting sample selection (i.e., 
positive fertility intentions at Wave 1) may affect my outcome variable. Future research with a 
larger number of sample and longer period of coverage will provide insight into the examination 
of different mechanisms of childbearing decision-making concerning unintended (e.g., mistimed 
or unwanted) births.  
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Measurement issues, linked to the available indicators in this data set also hinder the 
precision of the models. I assess men’s participation in housework and childcare based on 
women’s estimates of their husband’s contributions, which may be biased. Future research, 
employing other data sets, would do well to utilize men’s direct reports. Finally, this analysis 
was confined to a time frame of three years. Three years may not be a long enough period of 
time in which to realize fertility intentions for some women. In future studies, I will include 
additional waves of the KLoWF for a deeper discussion of the correspondence between fertility 
intentions and behavior including the differentiation of birth spacing and stopping.  
Overall, my findings contribute to the gender equity literature by providing insights from 
gender equity within the family revealing potential influences on fertility outcomes that may 
have implications for fertility recovery among settings in which low fertility norms are not yet 
fully culturally normative. Greater attention to men’s commitment to family by sharing 
housework and childcare, and educational responsibility may assist both scholars and policy 
makers in countries where many women fall short of realizing their fertility intentions in similar 
contextual backgrounds. Future research would do well to carefully assess how educational 
responsibilities affects gender equity within the family and individual fertility outcomes, as we 
seek to better understand low fertility across cultures and contexts. 
In this chapter, I found some support for positive impact of gender equity in the family on 
the realization of fertility intentions for a second child. In the next chapter, I explore the 
relationship between gender equity in the family and marital quality in order to understand how 
these work together and its implications on fertility outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 4  
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GENDER EQUITY IN THE FAMILY,  
MARITAL QUALITY AND FERTILITY BEHAVIOR  
 
INTRODUCTION 
As I discussed in the introductory chapter, South Korea has experienced massive demographic, 
economic and social transformation over the past forty years. However, many aspects of the 
traditional, patriarchal family structure have not changed much.  As the descriptive findings in 
the previous chapters indicate, only a quarter of my analytic sample (i.e., married women with 
one child) were employed and the rest of the women were in male breadwinner-female 
homemaker family models.  
Research suggests that women in most industrialized countries, including the most 
gender-equal societies still perform more household responsibilities than their husbands, since 
gender remains a key predictor of who performs household labor, including housework and 
childcare (Forste and Fox 2012; Greenstein 2009; Hook 2006). Comparative studies also reveal 
that contexts and places are significant in defining gender role expectations and highlight their 
interplay with individual-level factors (Fox 2009; Hook 2006). Geist (2005), for instance, 
suggests that equal sharing of household labor is shaped by contextual factors, such as welfare 
regimes, and found that social-democratic welfare regimes indicate more equal sharing of 
household labor than conservative societies.  
Throughout the previous chapters, I discussed the limited state support for families and 
low levels of gender equity in South Korea with regard to their implications for issues of low 
fertility. Reflecting this contextual background, in chapter 3 I demonstrated that gender inequity 
in the family plays an important role in realizing women’s intentions to have a second child. In 
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addition, I argued that heavy reliance on women’s educational responsibility for a child’s 
education may be another aspect of gender inequity in the family, especially in contexts 
characterized by high educational aspirations. But it remains unclear how gender equity in the 
family correlates with women’s marital quality. Does gender equity in the family, represented by 
more equal sharing of household labor and childcare and shared educational responsibility 
between couples, mean higher marital quality for women? Further, does marital quality matter at 
all for women’s fertility? Evidence about the influence of marital quality on fertility is sparse. 
The existing literature on this topic presents a puzzling picture regarding the impact of marital 
quality on fertility, although these studies are based on cases from Western contexts where 
marriage and childbearing are relatively loosely connected (Buchmann and Kriesi 2011).  
Little attention has been paid to the importance of partner relationship quality in 
understanding low fertility in non-Western contexts, such as advanced Asian countries. There is 
a substantial contextual and institutional difference in the ways by which the relationship 
between fertility and marriage operates in South Korea versus the ways it operates in Western 
countries. Recently, there has been growing research on marital quality and its determinants in 
non-Western contexts, including Nepal (e.g., Allendorf and Ghimire 2013) and China, Japan, and 
South Korea (Oshio, Nozaki, and Kobayashi 2013). This expansion into non-Western contexts 
provides opportunities for comparison across contexts (Allendorf and Ghimire 2013). Oshio and 
his colleagues (2013) suggested that it is reasonable to predict that marital dissatisfaction relating 
to the unequal sharing of housework between couples reduces fertility desires in East Asian 
countries. However, we do not know much about the impact of marital quality on fertility in 
contexts where the traditional male breadwinner and female homemaker family model is 
common.  
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The aim of this chapter is twofold: first, I examine the relationship between gender equity 
in the family and marital quality. Second, I investigate whether higher marital quality leads to 
having a second child. By looking at the intersection of marriage, family and fertility, this 
chapter contributes to broader theoretical questions about the relationship between gender equity 
in the family and marital quality, and their impact on fertility. I address the question of whether 
marital quality influences women’s fertility intentions and fertility outcomes in South Korea; and 
if so, what aspects of marital quality encourage or impede women in having a second child? The 
South Korean context provides a new opportunity to examine which aspects of marital 
relationship affect women’s childbearing decision-making in contexts where fertility is highly 
constrained by the institutional conditions.  
 
PREVIOUS FINDINGS & HYPOTHESES 
Gender equity in the family and marital quality 
Sociological studies on the division of household labor suggest that more equal sharing of 
household labor is positively associated with higher marital quality for women (Forste and Fox, 
2011). Amato and his colleagues (2007), for example, report that husbands’ share of housework 
has a positive effect on women’s marital happiness, and has a negative effect on marital 
problems and divorce proneness in the U.S. Similarly, Stevens, Kiger, and Riley (2001) find that 
hours spent by women on housework negatively influences their marital satisfaction, but hours 
spent by men on housework does not negatively influence their marital satisfaction. In general, 
women report lower marital satisfaction or marital happiness and are more likely to be affected 
by the division of household labor than men (Stevens et al. 2001). Likewise, recent evidence 
from Norway also supports this view by showing a strong correlation between the actual division 
90 
 
of household labor and satisfaction with this division for women, but a much weaker correlation 
for men (Barstad 2014: 987).  
However, the relationship between the division of household labor and marital quality 
varies by context (reflecting institutional and normative backgrounds), female employment, and 
gender role attitudes (usually held by women) (Baxter and Western 1998; Greenstein 1996; 
2009).  Gender role attitudes affect the amount of time spent on household labor, and they also 
influence women’s perceived gender (in)equity in the family concerning the division of 
household labor. Greenstein (1996) finds that perceived unfairness of the division of household 
labor has a stronger negative impact on marital quality for wives holding egalitarian gender role 
attitudes than for wives holding traditional attitudes. Using data from the Japanese General 
Social Survey, Kaufman and Taniguchi (2009) suggest that women report lower marital 
happiness when they hold more egalitarian attitudes.  
Studies have compared egalitarian women with traditional women by using the terms of 
“gender role attitudes” or “gender ideology”. Doucet (2006: 193) conceptualized gender 
ideology as “a set of social beliefs about men’s and women’s roles and relationships in varied 
social institutions.” This implies that a woman may express both egalitarian and traditional 
attitudes, such as expressing traditional attitudes toward women’s roles in the family, but 
egalitarian attitudes toward women’s roles in the public sphere. In association with this concern, 
different measures of gender role attitudes further complicate the issue. For instance, two studies 
examining the effects of gender role attitudes on fertility, utilizing the same survey data, found 
conflicting results about the relationship (see Puur et al. 2008 and Westoff and Higgins 2009 for 
varying results). Their studies differed in the measures they used for gender role attitudes, for 
instance, whether they measured attitudes toward gender roles in the public sphere or in the 
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private sphere (Goldscheider et al. 2010; Miettinen et al. 2011). With this in mind, gender role 
attitudes may be more closely associated with the gendered division of household labor and 
marital quality in some cases than in others for two possible reasons. One reason may be varying 
measures of gender role attitudes. The other may be the perceived meanings of gender role 
attitudes and their relations with the division of household labor or marital quality shaped by 
societal context (Forste and Fox 2012).   
Importantly, Greenstein (2009) find that the effect of inequity in the division of 
household labor on perceived fairness and the effect of perceived fairness on family satisfaction 
depend on national context (i.e., the national-level of gender equity). His cross-national analysis 
shows that the unequal division of household labor has a trivial effect on perceived fairness in 
countries with low levels of gender equity, and the impact of perceived fairness of the division of 
household labor on family satisfaction is also relatively small. Conversely, the effects of 
perceived (un)equal division of household labor are strong in countries with high levels of 
gender equity.  
Likewise, the determinants of marital quality may also differ by context. Lee and Ono 
(2008) explored the differences in the determinants of marital happiness for Japanese women and 
American women. Their findings suggest that Japanese women report happier marriages when 
they take primary responsibility for household labor and their household income is high, while 
American women report happier marriages when their own income is high. In a comparative 
study of three East Asian countries, including China, Japan, and South Korea, Oshio, Nozaki, 
and Kobayashi (2013) confirm the negative relationship between the shared division of 
household labor and marital satisfaction for women in all three countries. Moreover, their 
descriptive findings indicate that women’s share of housework is more than 75% in all three 
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countries, even when they are dual-earner couples. Lee et al. (2004) find that South Korean 
married women who reported difficulties with balancing family work and paid work showed 
higher levels of depression than their counterparts who did not have difficulty balancing two 
kinds of work.  
 Findings from reviewed studies form the basis for a set of my first hypotheses: 
H1a: Women’s high share of housework and childcare is likely to be negatively 
associated with women’s marital quality.  
H1b: Negative association between women’s high share of housework and childcare and 
marital quality is likely to be stronger for women holding egalitarian gender role 
attitudes than for women holding traditional gender role attitudes.  
 
 Additionally, I incorporate responsibility for a child’s education as a part of gender equity 
in the family, as I argued in chapter 3. Previous research on marriage and families in Asian 
countries emphasizes women’s role in society relating to family obligations. Due to high 
educational aspirations across Asian countries, parents – especially mothers – are responsible for 
raising “high-quality” children (Eun 2007; Jones 2007). If women face a substantial amount of 
pressure to meet this goal, they are likely to have lower marital quality. Similarly, Forste and Fox 
(2012) suggest that joint decision-making about family matters
31
 has a positive effect on 
respondents’ family satisfaction. Thus, my second hypothesis is: 
H2: Women who hold the primary responsibility for their children’s education are more 
likely to report lower marital quality than women whose husbands have joint 
responsibility for their children’s education.  
                                                             
31 Forste and Fox (2012) use the following two questions to determine whether a couple practices joint decision-
making: 1) “Who has the final say in choosing shared weekend activities? and 2) “Who has the final say in buying 
major things for the home?” 
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Marital quality and fertility 
There remains the question of whether a substantial burden of housework for women and its 
negative relationship with marital satisfaction would affect fertility (Oshio et al. 2013: 220).  
The growth of unstable relationships, including high rates of divorce, has brought increased 
attention to the influence of a union’s stability or relationship quality on childbearing (Balbo et al. 
2013). Previous studies have identified two opposing mechanisms in the association between 
relationship stability and fertility. One point of view finds that a stable marital relationship 
increases the chances of having a(nother) child. Lillard and Waite (1993) hypothesized that 
couples who are prone to separation are more likely to delay childbearing, and this delay also 
leads to wider birth intervals. Couples perceive that having children will increase the cost of 
marital dissolution, so couples with higher levels of marital instability are less likely to have a 
child.  
Conversely, building on the rational choice model of fertility, Friedman, Hechter and 
Kanazawa (1994) proposed that union instability is positively associated with childbearing since 
having children is a way of reducing uncertainty within marriage and enhancing marital 
solidarity in developed societies. They assumed that rational couples seek to reduce uncertainty 
in their marriage by having a child, thereby increasing the spouses’ dependence on each other 
and improving marital solidarity. Marital solidarity is a multidimensional quality of the 
relationship based on financial ties, occupational ties, and ties of common interest (Friedman et 
al. 1994: 386).  
A few studies using data from the U.S. support the first theoretical framework. Lillard 
and Waite (1993) found the negative impact of marital dissolution on the timing of childbearing 
in the U.S. This confirms previous findings regarding the negative relationship between marital 
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disruption and childbearing (Thornton 1978). Myers’ (1997) findings also support the positive 
impact of marital solidarity and compatibility (i.e., spouses’ involvement with each other) on the 
transition to parenthood and higher-order births in the U.S.   
The studies reviewed above mainly focus on the role that marital (in)stability plays in the 
likelihood of childbearing (Rijken and Liefbroer 2009). However, marital quality can include not 
only the stability of the relationship, but also the behavioral or evaluative aspects (e.g., 
satisfaction) of the marital relationship (Amato et al. 2003; Johnson et al. 1986). Drawing on the 
multidimensional approach to marital quality, recent studies have investigated the effect of 
marital quality on fertility behavior. Results are rather mixed. Rijken and Liefbroer (2009) 
extend the previous two opposing theoretical hypotheses on union stability to the effect of 
relationship quality on fertility behavior. They measured marital quality in four dimensions, 
including positive and negative interaction, value consensus, and separation proneness. Their 
findings suggest that couples postpone higher-order births (second or third births) if they have a 
high level of negative interactions but also if they have a high level of positive interactions. Put 
differently, couples were most likely to give birth when they experienced a medium-quality 
relationship (i.e., not having either excessively negative or positive interactions) with partners. 
By constructing a scale of relationship quality measure, Rijken and Thomson (2011) also 
confirmed the curvilinear relationship between perceived relationship quality and fertility for 
Dutch women, while Lainiala (2011) found a positive linear relationship between women’s 
relationship quality on second births in Finland. Investigating which dimensions of relationship 
quality have a significant impact on fertility would extend our current understanding of the link 
between the two (Lainiala 2011: 45). 
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Due to limited evidence, it is not clear whether the mechanism of the impact of marital 
quality on fertility might be different in other contexts. Moreover, although studies examining 
the case of non-Western contexts have paid increasing attention to marital quality in recent years 
(e.g., Allendorf and Ghimire 2013), implications for fertility have been little studied. In contexts 
characterized by a “marriage package,” meaning marriage comes with multiple intro-familial 
roles (Bumpass et al. 2009; Rindfuss 2004), and an inhospitable institutional environment which 
contributes to very low fertility (McDonald 2013), a high-quality marriage may be a necessary 
condition for having a second child. Guided by these previous studies, I formulate my third 
hypothesis concerning the impact of marital quality on fertility behavior:  
H3: Higher marital quality is likely to positively influence women’s second birth.  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Sample 
As in the two previous chapters, I use data from three waves of the Korean Longitudinal Survey 
of Women & Families (KLoWF), conducted by the Korean Women’s Development Institute in 
2007, 2008 and 2010. I use data on marital quality, fertility intentions, and all other control 
variables from Wave 1 and data on actual childbirths from Waves 2 and 3. For this study, I 
selected married women with one child who were aged 19-40 years at the time of Wave 1. Since 
only a few women progressed to third births by Wave 3, I focus on the transition to second births.  
My restrictions resulted in a sample of 463 women.   
 
Dependent variables 
The survey includes several questions suited for assessing marital quality. Marital quality is 
operationalized in a multidimensional way, including four distinctive aspects reflecting both 
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positive and negative dimensions. First, I constructed an index of spousal relationship quality, 
based on questions that focus on the overall global assessments of the wife’s relationship with 
her husband. The spousal relationship quality index includes the following four items: “I usually 
talk a lot with my husband,” “I have similar views with my husband,” “I am satisfied with the 
sexual relationship with my husband,” and “I trust my husband.” The alpha coefficient of the 
spousal relationship scale is .94. The responses are scored on a four-point scale ranging from 1 
(strongly agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). I summed the reverse-coded items and dichotomized 
due to highly skewed distribution. The scores of the low group on low spousal relationship 
quality
32
 were coded into 1, and the medium and high scores were coded into 0. Second, I 
measured marital happiness with one item: “All in all, what is the best description of your 
feeling about your current marital life with your husband?” Answers are scored on a seven-point 
scale ranging from 1 (very unhappy) to 7 (very happy). Because of a highly skewed distribution 
of the responses, I dichotomized the variable by singling out the approximately lowest quarter 
(21.66%) in terms of marital happiness.
33
   
Third, I measured separation proneness with one item: “Have you ever thought you’d be 
better off living apart from your husband in the past month?” Answers are coded as a 
dichotomous variable (0=no, 1=yes). Lastly, I included satisfaction with division of housework 
and childcare as a dimension of marital quality more directly related to the possible impact of 
the division of housework and childcare, following Barstad (2014). I used the following question: 
“How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the sharing of housework such as washing dishes and 
cleaning up the house, including childcare, with your husband?” Answers are coded on a 5-point 
scale ranging from 1 (strongly satisfied) to 5 (strongly dissatisfied). I dichotomized the scores by 
                                                             
32 It corresponds to a score of 11 or lower (range from 4 to 16).  
33 It corresponds to a score of 4 or lower (range from 1 to 7).  
97 
 
giving the value of 1 if respondents were ‘very dissatisfied’, ‘somewhat dissatisfied’, or ‘neither 
satisfied nor dissatisfied’; and 0 if respondents were ‘very satisfied’ or ‘somewhat satisfied’. 
Marital quality serves as a dependent variable for the first and the second hypotheses and then 
serves as an independent variable for the third hypothesis.  
 Birth of a second child. The dependent variable for the third hypothesis is the likelihood 
of a woman having a second child between Wave 1 and Wave 3 (2007-2010) or being pregnant 
during Wave 3.  
 
Independent variables  
Gender equity in the family is operationalized in two ways: First, I used the division of 
housework and childcare between couples as a measure of gender equity in the family. As I 
discussed in chapter 3, this measure is mostly widely used in sociological studies. Respondents 
were asked to report how much time they and their husbands spent on weekdays and weekends 
on housework (e.g., washing dishes, cleaning up, etc.) and childcare. To measure gender equity, I 
calculated relative shares for wives by dividing the averaged report of housework and childcare 
hours for respondents by the averaged report of all housework and childcare hours contributed by 
husbands and wives, following Greenstein (2009) and Torr and Short (2004). Second, I 
incorporated parents’ educational responsibility as a measure of gender equity in the family 
(given the importance in South Korean context as I argued in chapter 3). I compared women’s 
main responsibility for their children’s education with joint decision-making about children’s 
education with husbands.    
 Gender role attitudes are likely to influence respondents’ perceived fairness with regard 
to themselves and their husbands, as I expected in H1b. They are also likely to affect respondents’ 
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feelings about their share of housework and childcare, marital happiness, and ultimately fertility. 
Previous studies have measured gender role attitudes in diverse ways, including constructing an 
index based on multiple items or using a single item (Lachance-Grazela and Bouchard 2010). In 
this chapter, I measure gender role attitudes by focusing on women’s attitudes towards the 
traditional breadwinner family gender role set. The measure of gender role attitudes was based 
on level of agreement with the following statement: “It is ideal for man to earn money and for 
woman to take care of family.” Although wordings of this question vary by survey, this item is 
one of the most frequently used ones in the literature.
34
 Response choices were from 1 (strongly 
agree) to 4 (strongly disagree). For analytic purposes I dichotomized the responses and compared 
women with traditional attitudes (those who agreed with the statement) to women with 
egalitarian attitudes (those who disagreed with the statement).   
Control variables. Guided by the previous studies on marital quality (e.g., Allendorf and 
Ghimire 2013; Barstad 2014), I controlled for socio-demographic factors, including respondents’ 
age groups, education of the respondents and husbands, respondents’ shares of household income, 
household income, and marital duration. I compared married women aged less than 30 years at 
Wave 1 with women aged 30 to 34 and women aged 35 or above. I used the highest educational 
level attained to measure education and collapsed the responses into two categories (0=below a 
bachelor’s degree, 1=bachelor’s degree or higher). I measured respondents’ shares of household 
income as two dummy variables. I first calculated household income by adding respondents’ 
own income and husbands’ income. I then calculated relative shares for wives by dividing wives’ 
income by the household income contributed by husbands and wives together. I coded the first 
dummy variable 1 if the respondents’ share of household income was greater than 0 and less than 
                                                             
34 Studies based on 1994 and 2002 modules of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) used this 
statement for their index measure of a single item measure (see Davis et al. 2007; Fuwa 2004; Knudsen and 
Wæ rness 2008).  
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39% (0 otherwise). I coded the second dummy variable 1 if the respondents’ share of household 
income was 39% or greater. The reference category is respondents whose share of household 
income is 0 and who are unemployed. I measured household income as a dummy variable (1=the 
lowest household income, 0 if otherwise). I calculated marital duration based on responses for 
the married year from data at Wave 1. Given the fact that the national average marital duration 
for South Korean parents having a second child is 4.55 years (Statistics Korea 2013), I compared 
women married “5 years or less” with those married “more than 5 years.”  
Lastly, I also controlled for respondents’ subjective health, which is known for a 
determinant of marital quality (e.g., Barstad 2014; Oshio et al. 2013). Subjective health is 
measured with one question about respondents’ self-evaluation of health, ranging from 1 (very 
good) to 5 (very bad). I compared women whose self-evaluation of their health was very good 
(28%) with the rest of the women. Having domestic help may also be associated with gender 
equity in the family or with women’s marital quality. Given that few of my sample hired 
domestic help (N=4), however, this factor could not be controlled in this study. Research 
suggests that fertility intention is a strong predictor of fertility behavior (Kaufman and Bernhardt 
2012; Schoen et al. 1999), so I controlled for fertility intention in the models predicting a second 
childbirth. I measured this with the question asked in Wave 1: “Do you plan to have any 
children?” (0=no/don’t know, 1=yes).  
 
Method 
I examined the relationship between gender equity in the family and marital quality using binary 
logistic regression models for each of the four dimensions of marital quality. Then I examined 
whether or not marital quality had a significant effect on the probability of having a second child 
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between Wave 1, 2 and Wave 3, controlling for other socio-demographic factors and fertility 
intentions at Wave 1.  
 
FINDINGS 
Descriptive results 
In Table 7 I present descriptive statistics for the sample. About 41% of women with one child 
had a second child or were pregnant with a second child at Wave 3. About a half of my sample 
were dissatisfied with the division of housework and childcare. Slightly over 20% of the sample 
reported low spousal relationship quality or low marital happiness. Compared with other 
indicators of marital quality, relatively few women thought of separation (9.8%). Even women 
whose relative share of housework and childcare was lowest performed an average of 62.4% of 
housework and childcare. These descriptive statistics are similar with Oshio et al.’s (2013) 
findings suggesting Korean women’s high share of housework, even for dual-earner couples. 
Nearly a half of the respondents were mainly responsible for their children’s education. About 42% 
of respondents held traditional gender role attitudes.  
 The average age was 31 years. About 37% of the respondents and 53% of the respondents’ 
husbands were highly educated. About two thirds of respondents were unemployed. On average, 
the respondents had been married 5.1 years. Twenty-eight percent of them reported very good 
subjective health status.  
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Table 7 Descriptive statistics (weighted) for married women, age 40 or younger with one child at 
Wave 1, KLoWF Wave 1 – 3, 2007, 2008, 2010 (N=463) 
Variable Percent 
Fertility intention (yes) 51.03 
Gave birth between Wave 1 and Wave 3 (or women pregnant at Wave 3) 41.21 
Marital quality  
Dissatisfaction with division of housework and childcare 50.01 
Low spousal relationship quality 23.89 
Low marital happiness  21.30 
Separation proneness (yes)  9.82 
Wife’s share of housework and childcare (mean)  
1
st
 quartile (62.39%) 28.12 
2
nd
 quartile (82.64%) 22.67 
3
rd
 quartile (92.78%) 25.05 
4
th
 quartile (99.60%) 24.16 
Responsibility for children’s education   
Mostly wife’s decision 46.61 
Joint decision with the husband  53.39 
Traditional gender role attitudes (yes) 42.20 
Age   
   Less than 30 32.90 
   30-34 37.70 
   35-40 29.40 
Education (college +) 36.55 
Husband's education (college +)  53.90 
Wife’s income share   
Unemployed  74.41 
Less than 39% 13.03 
39% or greater  12.56 
Household income (lowest quartile)  33.11 
Marital duration  
5 years or less 63.82 
Above 5 years  36.18 
Subjective health (very good) 27.65 
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Multivariate logistic regression models predicting marital quality  
Table 8 presents the results of four models predicting four dimensions of women’s marital 
quality: dissatisfaction with division of housework and childcare, spousal relationship quality, 
marital happiness, and separation proneness. I start with the dimension of marital quality that is 
directly associated with the division of housework and childcare. In line with my first hypothesis, 
an equal sharing of housework and childcare is associated with level of satisfaction. Compared to 
women who do all or nearly all of the housework and childcare, women who share duties with 
their husbands are significantly less likely to be dissatisfied with the division of housework and 
childcare. The odds ratio for being dissatisfied with the division of housework and childcare was 
as low as 0.06 when women’s share of housework and childcare was in the lowest quartile. Even 
women whose share of housework and childcare was in the 3
rd
 quartile (i.e., an average share of 
93%) are 75% less likely to be dissatisfied with the division of housework and childcare than 
women in the reference group (i.e., the highest share of housework and childcare). All other 
factors being equal, women are least dissatisfied when they perform little housework and 
childcare. Responsibility for children’s education has no effect on the dissatisfaction with the 
division of housework and childcare.  
 Is an unequal sharing of housework and childcare also associated with spousal 
relationship quality? Supporting H1, Table 8 shows a significant relationship between the 
sharing of housework and childcare and spousal relationship quality. Women whose share of 
housework and childcare is in the 2
nd
 quartile (i.e., an average share of 83%) are significantly 
less likely to report low spousal relationship quality, compared to women who do nearly all of 
the housework and childcare. However, women whose share of housework and childcare is in the 
lowest or in the 3
rd
 quartile do not show any significant difference in spousal relationship quality 
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from the reference group. This suggests that the effects of the relative share of housework and 
childcare are less clear for spousal relationship quality than for satisfaction with the division of 
housework and childcare. In contrast, responsibility for children’s education also shows a 
significant effect on spousal relationship quality. Women who are mainly responsible for their 
child’s education are nearly three times more likely to report low spousal relationship quality 
when compared with women who have joint responsibility with their husbands.     
Next, I investigated the relationship between gender equity in the family and marital 
happiness. In line with H1, women whose share of housework and childcare is lower than the 
highest quartile are significantly less likely to report low marital happiness. Put differently, 
women who do nearly or all housework and childcare are substantially more prone to low marital 
happiness. In addition, women who take primary responsibility for their children’s education are 
significantly more prone to low marital happiness. Women who are mostly responsible for the 
children’s education are two times more likely to report low marital happiness. The more 
responsibility a woman takes for her children’s education, the less marital happiness she reports.  
Finally, the last model in Table 8 presents the analysis of separation proneness. Women’s 
relative share of housework and childcare is correlated with separation proneness, as expected in 
H1. However, the coefficients are generally weaker than the coefficients for the other dimensions 
of marital quality. Wives whose share of housework and childcare is in the lowest or the second 
lowest quartile are less prone to separation from their husbands compared with women who do 
nearly all the housework and childcare. In contrast, women’s taking primary responsibility for 
their children’s education shows no significant correlation with women’s separation proneness.  
Women’s attitudes toward the traditional breadwinner family model are not significantly 
associated with women’s marital quality in any of the four models. This finding does not support 
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H1b.
35
 A few control variables indicate sizeable associations with women’s marital quality. 
Women’s age has a significant relationship with spousal relationship quality. Women aged 35 or 
above are three times more likely to report low spousal relationship quality compared to women 
aged less than 30. Highly educated women are more likely to report dissatisfaction with the 
division of housework and childcare and low spousal relationship quality compared to women 
with no college education. By contrast, the husband’s education produces the opposite effect. 
Women with highly educated husbands are less likely to be dissatisfied with the division of 
housework and childcare. Working women whose share of income is less than 39% are 
approximately two times more likely to be dissatisfied with the division of housework and 
childcare when compared to unemployed women. Low household income is positively 
associated with low spousal relationship quality. Marital duration is not significantly associated 
with any of the four dimensions of marital quality. Lastly, women’s subjective health is only 
weakly associated with spousal relationship quality, and is not significantly associated with the 
other three dimensions of marital quality.  
  
                                                             
35 Recent studies have suggested that the inconsistency between women’s gender role attitudes and their actual 
practice (or behavior) may lead to dissatisfaction with family life (Forste and Fox 2012) or lowered childbearing 
(Goldscheider et al. 2013). So I also tested for inconsistency between women’s attitudes toward the traditional 
breadwinner family model and their labor force participation, by constructing a dummy variable indicating 
‘congruence’ or ‘incongruence’. However, the results show no significant impact on marital quality or on fertility 
behavior (results not shown).  
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Table 8 Results of logistic regression analyses for variables predicting marital quality for married Korean women, age 40 or younger with 
parity one at Wave 1, KLoWF 2007 (N=463)  
 
Dissatisfaction with the 
division of household 
labor, including 
childcare  
Low spousal relationship 
quality  
Low marital happiness  Separation proneness  
Variable B S.E. OR B S.E. OR B S.E. OR B S.E. OR 
Age (ref. less than 30)             
   30-34 .25 .32 1.24 .52 .40 1.68 .11 .38 1.09 .71 .50 2.03 
   35-40 .09 .37 1.09 1.13 .45 3.09* .46 .45 1.47 .05 .60 1.05 
Education (college +) .63 .33 1.68
+
 .87 .38 2.38* .40 .40 1.56 .74 .52 2.01 
Husband's education (college +) -.60 .29 .52* -.55 .34 .57 -.59 .39 .58 -.45 .48 .64 
Wife’s income share  
(ref. unemployed) 
            
  Less than 39% .90 .38 1.98* .53 .43 1.70 .43 .43 1.46 .86 .53 2.36 
  39% or greater  .10 .43 .72 .57 .45 1.77 .44 .39 1.73 .88 .58 2.41 
Household income (lowest quartile) .15 .27 1.81 .73 .31 2.07* -.37 .32 .67 .52 .39 1.69 
Marital duration (5 years or less) .42 .30 1.52 -.23 .32 .80 .31 .34 1.41 -.03 .46 .97 
Subjective health (very good)  -.29 .28 .75 -.61 .35 .54+ -.45 .35 .61 -.74 .52 .48 
Traditional gender role attitudes .23 .25 1.25 -.05 .29 .95 .09 .30 1.10 -.41 .39 .66 
Wife’s share of housework and 
childcare (ref. highest quartile) 
            
Lowest quartile -2.79 .40 .06*** -.46 .37 .63 -1.24 .38 .29*** -1.27 .54 .28* 
2
nd
 quartile -2.33 .39 .10*** -1.03 .39 .36** -1.28 .41 .28** -1.26 .54 .28* 
3
rd
 quartile -1.39 .39 .25*** -.30 .38 .74 -1.29 .39 .28*** -.52 .47 .60 
Responsibility for children’s 
education (mostly wife’s decision) 
.11 .25 1.12 1.08 .28 2.95*** .59 .29 2.02* .56 .41 1.74 
Constant 1.24 .52  -2.19 .58  -.93 .60  -2.30 .72  
McFadden’s Adjusted R2 .173 .135 .107 .104 
Note: + <.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. S.E. denotes standard error. OR denotes odds ratio.  
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Multivariate logistic regression models predicting a second birth  
In Table 9 I present the logistic regression results predicting the likelihood of having a second 
birth or being pregnant with a second child at Wave 3. I first focus on the influence of marital 
quality in explaining women’s second births or being pregnant with a second child. Then I move 
on the effects of control variables. Each model tests the effects of a specific dimension of marital 
quality on the likelihood of childbirth.  
Model 1 reveals that dissatisfaction with the division of housework and childcare has no 
significant effect on women’s decision to have a second child. By contrast, the relative share of 
housework and childcare presents clearer effects. Compared with women who do all or nearly all 
of the housework and childcare, women whose share of housework and childcare is in the lowest 
quartile (p<.10) or in the 3
rd
 quartile (p<.01) are significantly more likely to have a second child. 
Women whose relative share of housework and childcare is in the 2
nd
 quartile are not 
significantly different from women in the reference group (i.e., relative share is in the highest 
quartile). Women primarily responsible for their children’s education are less likely to have a 
second child compared to women who have a joint responsibility for their child’s education with 
their husbands at the p<.10.  
Next, Model 2 shows that low spousal relationship quality exhibits a negative association 
with the likelihood of a second birth at the p<.10 level (OR=0.55). As found in Model 1, the 
wife’s share of housework and childcare shows a significant effect on the likelihood of having a 
second child. Women whose share of housework and childcare is in the 3
rd
 quartile are 
significantly more likely to have a second child compared with women who perform nearly or all 
housework and childcare. The odds of having a second child (OR = 2.74), including being 
pregnant with a second child, are highest for women who fall within the 3
rd
 quartile regarding 
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relative share of housework and childcare. However, women’s having primary responsibility for 
their children’s education shows no significant impact on the likelihood of having a second child 
in this model.  
In Model 3 I estimated the relationship between marital happiness and second births. 
Women who reported low marital happiness are less likely to have a second child, but this 
relationship is not statistically significant. In line with the two previous models, however, the 
wife’s share of housework and childcare shows a significant influence on women’s second births. 
In addition, women who are mainly responsible for their children’s education are less likely to 
have a second child compared with women who have joint responsibility with their husbands for 
their children’s education. Finally, in Model 4 I examined the effect of separation proneness on 
the likelihood of second births within 3 years after the initial interview. Women’s separation 
proneness is not associated with second births when other variables are included in the model. 
This finding does not support H3. Again, women’s share of housework and childcare exhibits a 
significant effect on the likelihood of second births. Therefore, as for second births, I conclude 
that women’s marital quality has no significant effect, with the exception of spousal relationship 
quality at the p<.10 level. Hypothesis 3 is only weakly supported for spousal relationship.  
As expected, women’s fertility intention is a very strong predictor for the birth of a 
second child. Women with positive second birth intentions are about six times more likely to 
have a second child compared with women who have no positive intentions at Wave 1. Among 
other socio-demographic control variables, only two indicate significant association with the 
likelihood of having a second child. Women’s age has a negative effect on the likelihood of 
having a second birth. Compared to women aged less than 30, women aged 35 or greater are 
significantly less likely to have a second child. Women who have been married for five years or 
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less are approximately two times more likely to have a second child compared to women who 
have been married longer than five years. Women’s and their husbands’ education, the wife’s 
share of household income, household income, women’s subjective health, and women’s gender 
role attitudes do not show significant associations with the likelihood of having a second child. 
These findings are consistent across all four models.  
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Table 9 Logistic regression predicting the likelihood of childbirth by Wave 3 or in pregnancy at Wave 3 for married Korean women, age 
40 or younger with parity one at Wave 1, KLoWF 2007, 2008, and 2010 (N=463) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable B S.E. OR B S.E. OR B S.E. OR B S.E. OR 
Age (ref. less than 30)             
   30-34 -.22 .34 .80 -.18 .34 .84 -.23 .34 .80 -.19 .34 .83 
   35-40 1.50 .47 .22*** -1.44 .47 .24*** -1.51 .47 .22*** -1.51 .46 .22*** 
Education (college +) -.17 .35 .85 -.09 .35 .91 -.18 .35 .84 -.13 .35 .87 
Husband's education (college +) .43 .34 1.54 .41 .33 1.51 .45 .34 1.56 .42 .33 1.52 
Wife’s income share   
(ref. unemployed) 
            
Less than 39% -.45 .49 .64 -.47 .50 .63 -.46 .49 .63 -.46 .50 .63 
39% or greater  -.24 .51 .78 -.25 .49 .78 -.24 .50 .79 .25 .51 .78 
Household income (lowest 
quartile) 
.26 .32 1.30 .32 .32 1.38 .28 .32 1.32 .27 .32 1.31 
Marital duration (5 years or less) .79 .34 2.21* .81 .35 2.25* .78 .34 2.17* .79 .34 2.20* 
Subjective health (very good) .40 .29 1.49 .38 .29 1.46 .41 .29 1.50 .39 .29 1.47 
Traditional gender role attitudes .13 .29 1.14 .14 .29 1.15 .13 .29 1.14 .13 .29 1.13 
Wife’s share of housework and 
childcare (ref. highest quartile) 
            
Lowest quartile .56 .44 1.76 .57 .41 1.76 .62 .41 1.86 .55 .41 1.73 
2
nd
 quartile .05 .47 1.05 -.03 .44 .97 .11 .46 1.12 .01 .45 1.01 
3
rd
 quartile 1.01 .40 2.75* 1.01 .40 2.74* 1.06 .41 2.87** 1.01 .40 2.73* 
Responsibility for children’s 
education (mostly wife’s decision) 
-.52 .29 .59
+
 -.46 .29 .63 -.54 .29 .58
+
 -.50 .29 .61
+
 
Marital quality             
Dissatisfied with the division of 
housework and childcare 
-.06 .30 .94          
Low spousal relationship quality    -.59 .36 .55
+
       
Low marital happiness       .12 .36 1.13    
Separation proneness           -.52 .40 .59 
Fertility intentions 1.76 .30 5.82*** 1.73 .30 5.62*** 1.78 .29 5.95*** 1.76 .30 5.83*** 
Constant -1.97 .69  -1.96 .64  -2.07 .64  -1.96 .64  
McFadden’s Adjusted R2 .299 .304 .299 .301 
Note: 
+
 <.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. S.E. denotes standard error. OR denotes odds ratio.  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION     
This chapter began with three hypotheses regarding the relationship between gender equity in the 
family and marital quality, and the influence of marital quality on the likelihood of having a 
second child. The analyses presented in this chapter show that gender equity in the family is 
significantly associated with marital quality. I measured gender equity in the family with two 
indicators, including the wife’s relative share of housework and childcare and responsibility for 
child(ren)’s education. Contributing to the multidimensional approach to marital quality, I 
conceptualized marital quality as a multidimensional concept that encompasses both positive and 
negative, and both appraisal and behavioral aspects of the marital relationship with the husband. 
The following findings are consistent across all four dimensions of marital quality: satisfaction 
with the division of housework and childcare, spousal relationship quality, marital happiness, 
and separation proneness.  
First, women’s low share of housework and childcare is strongly associated with high 
marital quality. The less they do, the better. Hypothesis 1 receives strong support. On the 
contrary, Hypothesis 2, regarding the relationship between women’s having primary 
responsibility for children’s education and marital quality, receives partial support. It matters for 
spousal relationship quality and marital happiness only. Women who are mainly responsible for 
their children’s education are more likely to have low spousal relationship quality and low 
marital happiness than women who have joint responsibility with their husbands. These findings 
provide support for the conclusion that women are more satisfied when they are not primarily 
responsible for a given household tasks, including household decision-making (e.g., Forste and 
Fox 2012). However, women’s having main responsibility for children’s education shows no 
significant association with dissatisfaction with the division of household labor and separation 
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proneness. Thus, this study contributes to a body of research suggesting that the relative share of 
household labor is associated with diverse dimensions of marital quality. Furthermore, while I 
identify gender equity in the family as a key determinant of marital quality in this context, I also 
find that the majority of variations in marital quality are not explained by these factors or socio-
demographic factors.  
Second, my findings do not support the link between gender role attitudes and marital 
quality found in Japan (e.g., Kaufman and Taniguchi 2009) or in the U.S. (e.g., Minnotte et al. 
2010).
36
 In their comparative studies, however, Greenstein (2009) and Forste and Fox (2012) 
found that there is no significant relationship between gender role attitudes and marital quality 
when they take into account national-level indicators such as levels of gender equity (e.g., Global 
Gender Gap) and economic development (e.g., HDI). With this in mind, my findings may imply 
that scholars should be very cautious about interpreting the meanings of gender role attitudes and 
how they work. The descriptive findings show that the majority of South Korean women perform 
more than half of the housework and childcare regardless of their employment status. Therefore, 
performing housework and childcare are very much expected and unavoidable tasks that “comes 
with the package” for married women. Given these cultural normative ideas about taking care of 
family as showing competency both as a mother and as a wife, agreement or disagreement with 
the breadwinner family model may not necessarily lead to significant differences in women’s 
marital quality. Future research exploring a new measure of gender role attitudes more relevant 
to marital quality for Korean women would help clarify the picture.  
                                                             
36 I tested H2 with a different measure of gender role attitudes, a scale measure summing four items (alpha = .67) 
asking respondents’ opinion about family values:  “It is ideal for man to earn money and for woman to take care of 
family,” “A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works,”  “Dual-earner couples should equally 
share household labor,” and “A woman should work to make the marital relationship equal.” However, the results 
did not show any significant difference from the results that I discussed in this chapter.  
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Lastly, Hypothesis 3, concerning the effect of marital quality on the likelihood of having 
a second child, receives very weak support. Low spousal relationship quality negatively 
influences women’s second births. However, other dimensions of women’s marital quality do not 
significantly influence the likelihood of having a second child when controlling for socio-
demographic factors and gender equity in the family. Instead, the findings suggest that gender 
equity in the family, especially the wife’s share of housework and childcare plays an important 
role in having a second child. As expected, of course, women’s fertility intentions exert a very 
strong effect on women’s second births.  
With regard to the effect of the wife’s share of housework and childcare, women who are 
most likely to have a second child are those whose share of housework and childcare is in the 3
rd
 
quartile, compared to women who do nearly all housework and childcare. Interestingly, women 
whose share of housework and childcare is in the lowest or the second lowest quartiles show 
significant difference in terms of their likelihood of having a second child. This may be because 
these women who are in the 3
rd
 quartile in terms of the relative share of housework and childcare 
are likely to be unemployed full-time mothers with husbands who are involved in housework and 
childcare to some extent. Given the relatively small difference in wives’ share of housework and 
childcare from the reference group, husbands’ time spent on housework and childcare would not 
be substantially different between the two groups. However, women may evaluate that small 
difference substantially differently, from being a negligible to non-negligible share.     
The significance influence of low spousal relationship quality on women’s second births 
may also reflect the level of husbands’ involvement in the family. My measure of spousal 
relationship quality is mostly based on respondents’ evaluations of positive interactions with 
their husbands. This suggests that more positive engagements with the husbands demonstrate a 
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higher marital quality and thus provide a favorable environment for having a second child. In 
turn, this suggests the importance of behavioral aspects of marital relationships based on men’s 
involvement in the familial roles, both as husbands and as fathers, to marriage and childbearing 
decisions. As such, I believe this study adds to a substantial body of research demonstrating the 
importance of greater male involvement in the family on strengthening family and realizing 
fertility desires (e.g., Goldscheider et al. 2015).   
One potential problem with this study, as discussed in other chapters as well, is the lack 
of direct information from the husbands of the women interviewed. Without such data I needed 
to rely on wives’ account of husbands’ contributions to household labor and childcare. Another 
possible shortcoming of the data is that I could not take into account men’s perspectives on 
marital quality or their intention for having a second child. Rijken and Thomson (2011) found 
that women’s marital quality and men’s marital quality have different effects on fertility by 
parity. It is also possible that couples may have different intentions regarding having a second 
child. It would be fruitful to examine how the dynamics of both partners’ fertility intentions and 
their appraisal of marital quality affect fertility outcomes. Moreover, further research is needed 
to consolidate the findings of this study in other non-Western settings. This study exclusively 
focused on women with one child. It would be valuable to examine the role of marital quality on 
the likelihood of having a first child among childless women in contexts where there exist a 
substantial proportion of childless couples.  
My findings show that tangible support from husbands for household responsibilities (i.e., 
housework, childcare, and educational responsibility) is most important for women’s marital 
quality. My findings also underscore the fact that specific dimensions of marital quality may be 
more closely tied to women’s fertility decision-making process in South Korean context. I hope 
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my results will encourage future researchers to test the relationship between marital quality and 
childbearing in other Asian contexts. Overall, these findings reinforce the importance of gender 
equity in the family to women’s higher marital quality and ultimately to second births. These 
findings provide strong support for the association between gender equity in the family and 
marital quality. This conclusion also buttresses my argument concerning the significance of 
gender equity in the family for the realization of fertility intentions for a second child as 
presented in Chapter 3.  
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CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSION 
 
In this work, I examined the intersection of low fertility, marriage, and family with an emphasis 
on the role of gender equity in explaining lowest-low fertility in South Korea. Utilizing data from 
a panel survey, I have brought a new perspective to the growing body of literature on low 
fertility, a perspective that is especially suited to cultural contexts in which high educational 
aspirations and the traditional male breadwinner-female homemaker family model are pervasive. 
In this chapter, I discuss the key findings of my research and their contributions to the literature 
on low fertility. I conclude by providing an overview of the main limitations of this research and 
suggesting directions for future research.  
 
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
The Importance of Different Sources of Family-Supportive Environments for Fertility 
Recent theories of low fertility emphasize the increasing importance of family support for 
shifting gender roles toward egalitarianism (Esping-Andersen 2015; McDonald 2000a; 2000b). 
Many studies support this argument by showing the importance of institutional support, often 
referred to as national-level gender equity, for achieving compatibility between parenthood and 
labor force participation, especially for women. A comparative study of OECD countries by 
Thévenon (2011) reveals that a group of countries, including Japan and South Korea, 
demonstrate a deficit of policies enabling work and family balance. Thévenon (2011:64) further 
contends that Korea is markedly different even from the countries in the same group with regard 
to levels of state support for families, indicating that it “clearly lag[s] behind the other OECD 
countries, whichever type of support is considered.”  
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Given this background, I asked the following questions in chapter 2. In a context of weak 
institutional support for families and low levels of gender equity, do family policies influence 
individual fertility? Moreover, might support from other sources, such as men’s involvement in 
the family or grandparental childcare assistance, positively influence fertility intentions and 
behavior? I examined the impact of family support for childbearing and childrearing from three 
sources – institutions, partners, and parents or in-laws – on women’s fertility intentions and 
behavior concerning second children. Supportive environments for family from these three 
sources demonstrate stronger positive effects on actual fertility than on fertility intentions for 
second children. Women who are very familiar with family policy with regard to fathers’ use of 
parental leave are more likely to have a second child than women who do not know about it at all. 
Support from husbands and grandparental childcare assistance increases the likelihood of second 
births.   
These findings contribute to our theoretical understanding of the interplay between the 
welfare state and the family in studies of fertility. I highlighted the importance of the availability 
of other sources of support for family, such as husbands and grandparental childcare assistance. 
Moreover, my findings have unique implications for very low fertility in countries with limited 
and fragmented state support of families. In the following chapter, I paid particular attention to 
the effects of gender equity in the family, which I measured via men’s involvement in the family. 
 
Gender Equity in the Family and the Realization of Fertility Intentions  
In chapter 3, I investigated whether gender equity within the family influences the 
realization of fertility desires within the context of institutional gender inequality. Given the 
institutional and cultural differences between Western contexts and South Korea, I tested the 
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influence of gender equity in the family on fertility, specifically the realization of fertility 
intentions for a second child. I posed the question of whether indications of higher gender equity 
in the family always have a positive impact on the realization of fertility intentions in South 
Korea, which have been marked by a relatively recent transition to low fertility and low gender 
equity regimes.  
I found that women’s gender role attitudes, husbands’ housework, and women’s 
responsibility for children’s education influence the likelihood of realizing a second birth. My 
results highlight the importance of men’s household contributions and women’s educational 
responsibilities on the realization of fertility intentions within low fertility regimes. One of my 
unique contributions in chapter 4 is incorporating parental responsibility for children’s education 
as an aspect of gender equity in the family. Integrating patterns of educational responsibility as a 
dimension of gender equity in the family also extends the gender equity literature. My findings 
indicate that the fertility impact of women’s educational responsibility for their children interacts 
with women’s domestic responsibilities for housework and childcare. I argue that over-reliance 
on mothers’ educational responsibility may add another taxing facet to domestic responsibilities; 
and thus I expand our conventional understanding of the ‘second shift’ of housework and 
childcare. 
 
The Relationship between Gender Equity in the Family, Marital Quality, and Fertility 
Behavior  
In chapter 4, I moved my theoretical focus to the association between gender equity in the 
family and women’s marital quality, and their ultimate influence on women’s fertility behavior. 
Research suggests that women in most industrialized countries, including the most gender-equal 
118 
 
societies, still perform more household responsibilities than their husbands. Moreover, there is 
evidence that women’s relationship quality is more closely associated with the division of 
household labor than is men’s relationship quality. I posed the question of whether gender equity 
in the family is associated with Korean women’s marital quality. My results showed significant 
associations between gender equity in the family and women’s marital quality. Four distinctive 
dimensions of marital quality – dissatisfaction with the division of household labor, spousal 
relationship quality, marital happiness, and separation proneness – are significantly associated 
with the wife’s share of housework and childcare. Dissatisfaction with the division of household 
labor and marital happiness showed very strong associations.  
I further asked whether this relationship between gender equity in the family and marital 
quality influenced women’s second births during the three years since their initial response. In 
general, my findings showed no significant relationship between marital quality and women’s 
second births, except in the dimension of spousal relationship quality. Women having low 
spousal relationship quality are significantly less likely to have a second child than women 
having high spousal relationship quality. In contrast to marital quality, gender equity in the 
family showed a more consistent influence on women’s second births. Given that women whose 
relative shares of housework and childcare is in the 3
rd
 quartile (2
nd
 highest group) are more 
likely to have a second child compared with women who perform nearly or all the housework 
and childcare, these women are likely to be full-time mothers with supportive husbands. It is 
important to acknowledge that these husbands’ involvement in housework and childcare may not 
be considered negligible by the women, even though the absolute hours spent by their husbands 
on housework and childcare is not high. These findings reinforce the importance of gender 
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equity in the family, meaning men’s greater involvement in familial roles impacts South Korean 
women’s birth of a second child.  
 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS  
 This research makes two main contributions to the literature on gender and low fertility. 
First, it demonstrates the mechanisms through which gender equity in the family shapes 
women’s marriage and fertility, both in terms of fertility behaviors and in terms of the realization 
of fertility intentions. Second, it offers new insights on the interplay between the state and the 
family in achieving family demands, including work-family balance and having an additional 
child. It further increases our understanding of the different contexts that are revealed in a rapid 
fertility decline, lowest-low fertility, low gender equity regimes, and weak institutional support 
for childrearing. 
Understanding the Role of Gender Equity 
Studies building upon gender equity theory at the micro-level suggest that gender equity 
in the family is conducive to fertility intentions or fertility behaviors (Cooke 2009; Mills et al. 
2008; Torr and Short 2004).  However, there is relatively little evidence to test the link between 
gender equity and fertility in non-Western low fertility contexts. By examining four aspects of 
gender equity in the family, this case study of South Korea confirms and challenges the findings 
from European and North American cases. My findings suggest that South Korean women with 
traditional gender role attitudes may face high levels of pressure to fulfill their expected roles in 
the family, including raising a high-quality child, with no or little support from husbands and 
institutions.  
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Another unique contribution of this research is integrating patterns of educational 
responsibility as an aspect of gender equity in the family, thus extending gender equity literature. 
My findings indicate that women’s educational responsibility for their children interacts with 
their domestic burdens of housework and childcare in terms of their effect on fertility. Women 
who are the main decision-makers for their children’s education and who also bear substantial 
responsibility for housework and childcare demonstrate the lowest probability of realizing their 
fertility intentions. These findings open up new areas of inquiry and challenge previous studies 
in high fertility settings, as mothers’ educational responsibility for their children can be an 
additional domestic burden. This expands our conventional understanding of the “second shift” 
of housework and childcare, which is particularly relevant in the context of low gender equity 
and high educational aspirations. Thus, this speaks to the literature linking gender equity and 
fertility and suggests an area for more male involvement in the family as a powerful pathway to 
increasing fertility in very low fertility countries.  
Importantly, this research suggests that gender equity in the family is significantly 
associated with women’s marital quality. Building upon the multidimensional approach to 
marital quality, I measured marital quality via the following four aspects: satisfaction with the 
division of housework and childcare, spousal relationship quality, marital happiness, and 
separation proneness. My analyses showed that the share of housework and childcare between 
couples is strongly associated with all four aspects of marital quality. Furthermore, patterns of 
educational responsibility are associated with women’s spousal relationship quality and marital 
happiness. Overall, this suggests that women’s positive interactions with their husbands, based 
on the sharing of housework and childcare or educational responsibility for their children, 
provide favorable conditions for women’s marital quality.  
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The Interplay between the State and the Family  
One important factor that a handful of researchers have highlighted to explain differences 
in fertility rates across countries is institutional intervention which improves compatibility 
between parenthood and labor force participation (also referred to as institutional-level gender 
equity). Comparative studies have shown the positive influence of institutional support for 
families on national fertility rates (Anderson and Kohler 2015; Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015; 
Gauthier 2007; McDonald 2000a; 2013; Thévenon 2011). This growing area of research leaves 
open the question of how people find sources of support for their families’ needs in countries 
with limited state support to families. While previous studies at the micro level have examined 
the role of husbands’ involvement in housework and childcare or support from grandparental 
childcare on fertility, they often examined a single source of support.  
My research demonstrates the positive effects of a supportive environment for the family 
on fertility behavior. Existing studies suggest that family policy exerts a small positive influence 
on fertility (e.g., Gauthier 2007). Based on women’s knowledge of parental leave policy, this 
research suggests that Koreans receiving support from the state may be largely constrained by a 
lack of information, restrictive government policies, and gender inequality. These multiple constraints 
operate as a barrier for families considering an additional child. Given the relatively low 
awareness of the policy among mothers of a single child, the findings suggest that the failure of 
the welfare state may be more closely associated with policies’ ease of use than with the actual 
availability of support. Regarding the positive effect on fertility of support from grandparental 
childcare assistance, my findings are consistent with previous findings observed in Europe 
(Bühler and Philipov 2005; Hank and Kreyenfeld 2003; Rijken and Liefbroer 2009; Thomese 
and Liefbroer 2013). Within the context of limited support for families by the state, as well as 
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low male involvement in family care, this research suggests that grandparental childcare 
assistance is a significant source of support for families. Thus, this research fills in the gap in 
existing literature by integrating three sources of supportive environments for family and 
examining their effects on women’s fertility.  
This research also suggests the interplay between the welfare state and the family that 
may occur in low fertility countries with limited state support. Consistent with the previous 
findings from Europe (e.g., Thomese and Liefbroer 2013), my findings suggest that 
grandparental childcare assistance is an important supplementary source of support for families 
in South Korea. I argue that support from husbands or grandparents does not supplement support 
from institutions in the context where state support is “limited and highly fragmented” 
(Thévenon 2011). This context provides an unfavorable environment for mothers’ participation 
in the labor force. Moreover, South Korea ranks second in the number of hours worked among 
36 OECD countries, following Mexico (OECD 2016).
37
 In 2014, South Korean workers worked 
2124 hours per year
38
, which corresponds to 41 hours per week. These long hours worked are 
likely to restrict fathers’ participation in housework and childcare, which, in turn, may lead 
mothers to rely on support from their extended family, usually grandmothers, on a regular basis.  
The intertwined link between three sources of support for family raises concerns about 
the possible consequences of the low gender equity trap, which keeps increasing the family’s 
responsibilities over the life course. The state support for families in South Korea is 
characterized by a “one-time remedy” for a few life transitions instead of long-term reliable 
support. In this context, Korean families experience increasing challenges to balance work and 
                                                             
37 OECD (2016), Hours worked (indicator). doi: 10.1787/47be1c78-en (Accessed on 24 February 2016) 
38 This average annual hours worked is calculated by taking “the total number of hours actually worked per year 
divided by the average number of people in employment per year”. Actual hours worked include regular work hours 
of full-time, part-time and part-year workers, paid and unpaid overtime, and hours worked in additional jobs (OECD, 
2016).   
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family and to meet family needs over the life course, especially after marriage. The analyses 
from three substantive chapters reinforce the importance of increasing male involvement in the 
family in terms of housework, childcare, and educational responsibility. These findings support 
Goldscheider and her colleagues’ (2015) argument about the positive impact of male 
involvement in the family, as the second half of the gender revolution, in strengthening the 
family. Of course, men’s increased involvement in the family is crucial to boosting fertility. 
However, it may be challenging for families to receive support from husbands and grandparents 
without stable state support. In the context of limited and fragmented state support, families must 
take care of all needs by themselves, in isolation from the state and the market. The heart of the 
problem is that these institutions, which have operated as a driving force for compressed 
modernity in South Korea (Chang 2010), do not function effectively in meeting the needs of 
society or individual families. Overall, this demands an effort from the state and the market 
employment to cooperate with each other in creating egalitarian relationships and policies 
(Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015; Kaufman and Bernhardt 2012). 
 
LIMITATIONS & DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
One of the greatest challenges of studying fertility in South Korea is a lack of data including 
male respondents. Increasing amounts of literature on low fertility emphasize the male role in 
increasing fertility. However, many datasets that I reviewed for this research included only 
female respondents. This may be due to the social prejudice that low fertility is only a woman’s 
issue. Although the data I used for this research provided an exceptional opportunity for a deeper 
analysis of women’s attitudes, practices surrounding family and marriage, and their fertility 
history, one huge limitation I faced was the lack of men’s voices. I assessed men’s participation 
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in housework and childcare based on women’s estimates of their husband’s contributions, and 
that may be biased.   
 The lack of men’s voice also may contribute to the unexplained difference between 
fertility intentions and behavior. Men may have different childbearing plans from their wives, so 
couples may disagree on their childbearing plans. This possibility was excluded from my 
research. A further problem with the survey data, with regard to this particular research, was the 
limited time frame of a three-year period. Due to the availability of the datasets, I had to rely on 
the three waves of the KLoWF, which only covers three years. This is a possible factor that may 
lead to a gap between fertility intentions and behavior. Although the national average of birth 
spacing between first and the second births does not exceed three years, some couples may 
postpone their childbearing even if they intend to have a second child. A closer examination of 
the relationship between fertility intentions and behavior with a longer time frame would merit 
additional attention.  
 Another limitation of my study is that the respondents in my analytic sample share 
homogeneous characteristics (e.g., all married). As I mentioned in earlier chapters, selection 
effects are a concern. Future research involving a more heterogeneous sample in terms of 
respondents’ partnership status may provide different findings. Park and Raymo (2013) showed 
that divorce has been increasing in South Korea. The proportion of marriages ending within 5 
years of marital duration increased more than doubled from 5% for the 1991 marriage cohort to 
12% for the 2001 marriage cohort. They further revealed educational gradients in divorce by 
showing that less educated women (i.e., those who did not complete high school) face a greater 
risk of divorce than highly educated people. Educational gradients in divorce may also be 
associated with issues of gender equity, as my findings show that women who are mainly 
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responsible for housework and childcare as well as educational responsibility report lower 
marital quality and show the lowest probability of having a second child. These theoretical 
connections with marital instability would be a meaningful starting point for future research.  
Furthermore, a qualitative study might shed more light on how women shape 
childbearing plans and could explore other factors in fertility decision-making which were not 
examined in this research. My research demonstrates the need for understanding the complex 
ways women shape their fertility intentions and what guides their decisions. It is important to 
understand when women consciously plan and intend behavior and when they do not. My 
research showed that gender equity in the family provides a favorable condition for women to 
realize their fertility intentions. At the same time, this study addressed the possible consequences 
of increasing family burdens in the context of low gender equity and low state support. Studying 
low fertility in similar institutional contexts allows us to uncover possible mechanisms of low 
fertility and explore new determinants of fertility which may not work in Western contexts that 
are characterized by high gender equity and long-term low fertility rates. The South Korean 
context, characterized by a rapid fertility decline, lowest-low fertility, low gender equity regimes, 
and weak institutional support for childrearing, has the potential to make particular contributions 
to the theories of low fertility and gender equity. On a related note, the experiences of South 
Korea highlight the need for further research examining Asian low fertility cases that share 
similar cultural and institutional backgrounds, thus helping to expand the current literature on 
low fertility and on gender equity more broadly.   
I view this research as an early step toward understanding the mechanism of low fertility 
by studying a non-Western lowest-low fertility country. This case is distinctive from the cases of 
Europe or North America not only in terms of the speed and magnitude of fertility decline, but 
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also in terms of low gender equity regimes and weak institutional support for families. I have 
explored the unique aspects of gender equity in South Korean families to highlight the 
relationships between gender equity, family, and the state. My analyses emphasized that having a 
second child is likely to be a constrained choice dependent on supportive environments for the 
family. The availability of tangible support from multiple sources may determine the gap 
between fertility intentions and fertility behavior, especially in contexts where two-child family 
ideals are still pervasive. My findings add an additional layer of complexity to the relationship 
between gender equity and fertility by showing the need for support from both institutions and 
from husbands in the matter of fertility increases. It is important to note that increasing the 
aggregate-level fertility levels is not only an issue of policy, but also an issue for families in 
realizing their childbearing plans. I believe this research will advance sociology and social 
demography theoretically and inspire scholars of low fertility to expand the current literature by 
studying emerging areas of low fertility for a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of low 
fertility.  
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